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Liquidity, often defined as the ability of markets to absorb large transactions without much effect
on prices, plays a central role in the functioning of financial markets. This dissertation aims to
investigate the implications of liquidity from several different perspectives, and can help to close
the gap between theoretical modeling and practice.
In the first part of the thesis, we study the implication of liquidity costs for systemic risks in
markets cleared by multiple central counterparties (CCPs). Recent regulatory changes are trans-
forming the multi-trillion dollar swaps market from a network of bilateral contracts to one in which
swaps are cleared through central counterparties (CCPs). The stability of the new framework de-
pends on the resilience of CCPs. Margin requirements are a CCP’s first line of defense against
the default of a counterparty. To capture liquidity costs at default, margin requirements need to
increase superlinearly in position size. However, convex margin requirements create an incentive for
a swaps dealer to split its positions across multiple CCPs, effectively “hiding” potential liquidation
costs from each CCP. To compensate, each CCP needs to set higher margin requirements than
it would in isolation. In a model with two CCPs, we define an equilibrium as a pair of margin
schedules through which both CCPs collect sufficient margin under a dealer’s optimal allocation
of trades. In the case of linear price impact, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of an equilibrium is that the two CCPs agree on liquidity costs, and we characterize
all equilibria when this holds. A difference in views can lead to a race to the bottom. We provide
extensions of this result and discuss its implications for CCP oversight and risk management.
In the second part of the thesis, we provide a framework to estimate liquidity costs at a portfolio
level. Traditionally, liquidity costs are estimated by means of single-asset models. Yet such an
approach ignores the fact that, fundamentally, liquidity is a portfolio problem: asset prices are
correlated. We develop a model to estimate portfolio liquidity costs through a multi-dimensional
generalization of the optimal execution model of Almgren and Chriss (1999). Our model allows
for the trading of standardized liquid bundles of assets (e.g., ETFs or indices). We show that
the benefits of hedging when trading with many assets significantly reduce cost when liquidating
a large position. In a “large-universe” asymptotic limit, where the correlations across a large
number of assets arise from a relatively few underlying common factors, the liquidity cost of a
portfolio is essentially driven by its idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, the additional benefit from trading
standardized bundles is roughly equivalent to increasing the liquidity of individual assets. Our
method is tractable and can be easily calibrated from market data.
In the third part of the thesis, we look at liquidity from the perspective of market microstructure,
we analyze the value of limit orders at different queue positions of the limit order book. Many
modern financial markets are organized as electronic limit order books operating under a price-
time priority rule. In such a setup, among all resting orders awaiting trade at a given price, earlier
orders are prioritized for matching with contra-side liquidity takers. In practice, this creates a
technological arms race among high-frequency traders and other automated market participants to
establish early (and hence advantageous) positions in the resulting first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue.
We develop a model for valuing orders based on their relative queue position. Our model identifies
two important components of positional value. First, there is a static component that relates
to the trade-off at an instant of trade execution between earning a spread and incurring adverse
selection costs, and incorporates the fact that adverse selection costs are increasing with queue
position. Second, there is also a dynamic component, that captures the optionality associated with
the future value that accrues by locking in a given queue position. Our model offers predictions
of order value at different positions in the queue as a function of market primitives, and can be
empirically calibrated. We validate our model by comparing it with estimates of queue value
realized in backtesting simulations using marker-by-order data, and find the predictions to be
accurate. Moreover, for some large tick-size stocks, we find that queue value can be of the same
order of magnitude as the bid-ask spread. This suggests that accurate valuation of queue position is
a necessary and important ingredient in considering optimal execution or market-making strategies
for such assets.
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Liquidity is an rather broad yet elusive notion. In the most general sense, liquidity relates to “the
ability of an economic agent to exchange his or her existing wealth for goods and services or for
other assets”.1 In this thesis, we are particularly interested in the notion of market liquidity which
relates to the ability of markets to absorb large transactions of financial assets without much effect
on prices. Liquidity risk is then defined as the inability or potential cost of trading with immediacy.
In general, the cost of executing a certain position comes in many ways. The first is the fees (or
rebates) charged by the brokers and the exchange for their service. This is the most explicit part
of the cost that any investor pays and are often charged at a constant rate. Yet fees only takes up
a small component of the potential liquidity cost.
The second is the bid-ask spread paid by investors who take liquidity from the market by, for
example, placing market orders to buy or sell. A bid-ask spread is defined as the difference between
the ask price and bid price in the market. The economic intutions behind bid-ask spread has
been a important topic in the microstructure literature. Most markets are organized by centralized
specialists (as in the traditional dealer markets) or market makers (as in markets operate under
electric limit order books) who constantly provide liquidity and set the spread. Generally, the
spread has to be large enough to cover potential costs for those liquidity providers. And those
1According to “Liquidity Constraints” in The New Palgrave Dictio- nary of Economics, Second Edition, edited by
Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume.
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costs may include inventory costs as in Stoll (1978) and order-handeling costs as in Roll (1984).
More importantly, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) characterized bid-ask spread as a result of adverse
selection, where liquidity providers charge for the posibility of trading with agents with superior
information. In any case, the bid-ask spread reflects the willingness to trade of liquidity suppliers,
and often acts as a barometer for liquidity situations in the market.
The third component for liquidity cost is the price impact which is defined as the price move-
ment due to the trading activity. For example, a large buy order can push prices higher, making
subsequent purchases more expensive. Similarly, a sell order can push prices lower, reducing revenue
from subsequent sales. The concept of price impact are first established in the market microstruc-
ture literature, a review of which can be found in Biais et al. (2005). This literature has shown
that orders have both a transitory and a permanent impact on prices. In the short term, the order
creates imbalance between supply and demand, which prompts the market makers to move price
to source more liquidity. This effect is due to the lack of liquidity in the market and often poses
no impact on the fundamental value of the asset. Therefore, market price may soon reverse after
the order ends. The permanent component, on the other hand, reflects the information inferred
from the order flow by market makers. The fact that some orders may come from traders with
superior information prompts the market makers to consistently update their quotes to compensate
for adverse selection. This information is then permanently incorporated into market price.
Finally, liquidity cost also comes in the form of inventory risk. In order to minimize the overall
price impact, large trades are usually split into smaller ones and executed over time. This creates
inventory risks as fluctuations in market price can increase the gap between remaining and targeted
position.
One closely realted problem is that of optimal execution, which tries to find the optimal strategy
to unload a position at a low cost within a limit amount of time. Early literature such as Bertsimas
and Lo (1998) addressed the problem by solving a dynamic programing problem to minimize mean
transaction costs. Later formulations led by Almgren and Chriss (1999) also accounted for inventory
risks and therefore tried to balance the trade-off between risks and costs. A more detailed review
of literature on this issue is given in Section 1.2.
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
On a broader scale, the cost of liquidating large positions, especially in time of distress, can
potentially pose great threat to financial stability. For example, liquidity risk played a devastating
role in the most recent financial crisis. Highly leveraged institutions panically reduced positions
at a time when liquidity was scarse, therefore creating a fire sale which moved prices against them
leading to further losses. Pedersen (2008) describes this process as a “liquidity spiral”. After the
financial crisis, over-the-counter swap trades are required by law to be central cleared. In Chapter 2,
we find that this structure, though designed to mitigate risks by concentrating exposures in central
counterparty (CCP), potentially creates a new source of systemic risk related to the resilience of
the CCP itself. We show that a lack of coordination between CCPs could lead to a systematically
underestimation of liquidity cost, which threatens the stability of the central clearing system. More
details can be found in Section 1.1.
Managing liquidity risk is important in portfolio management, as the value of a portfolio depends
on its ability to be converted into cash, especially in time of distress. For open-end mutual fund,
the ability to meet its redemption request through adequate liquidity management is one of its core
responsibilities. As one of the regulators puts it:2
“Daily redeemability is a defining feature of mutual funds. This means that liquidity
management is not only a regulatory compliance matter, but also a major element of
investment risk management, an intrinsic part of portfolio management, and a constant
area of focus for fund managers.”
On October 13, 2016, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a far-reaching
rules requiring all mutual funds and open-end ETF to implement formal liquidity management
program. Meeting those standards requires accurate estimation of liquidity cost. In Chapter 3, we
provide a novel framework to estimate the liquidity costs in unloading portfolios instead of single
assets. Our work contributes to the literature of optimal execution and can help to fill the gap
between practice and theoretical modeling.
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we treat liquidity cost as exogenous functionals depending on the
2See ICI FSOC Notice Comment Letter, supra note 16.
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size of the transaction. But at a micro level, liquidity risk arises from the exchange of liquidity
among agents in market places such as limit order books. Chapter 4 contributes to the rich mi-
crostructure literature that help determine the micro foundation of liquidity risks. More specifically,
we investigate the value of limit orders at different queue positions, which can help solve high-level
decision problems such as market making and optimal execution.
The rest of this chapter introduces the following chapters in depth by positing the research
questions and objectives along with their connections to the literature. The research in Chapter 2
is a joint work with Professor Paul Glasserman and Professor Ciamac C. Moallemi. The research
in Chapters 3 and Chapter 4 resulted from collaborations with Professor Ciamac C. Moallemi.
1.1. Hidden Illiquidity and Multiple Central Counterparties
Swap contracts enable market participants to transfer a wide range of financial risks, including
exposure to interest rates, credit, and exchange rates. But swaps themselves can be risky. They
create payment obligations that often extend for five to ten years, and they allow participants to
take on highly leveraged positions. Indeed, while its proponents see the multi-trillion dollar swap
market as an efficient mechanism for risk management and transfer, critics have long seen it as an
opaque threat to financial stability.
Regulatory changes are transforming the swap market. Prior to the financial crisis of 2007–
2008, nearly all swaps traded over-the-counter (OTC) as unregulated bilateral contracts between
swap dealers or between dealers and their clients. In contrast, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act requires
central clearing of all standard swap contracts in the United States, and the European Market
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) imposes the same requirement in the European Union. The new
rules also bring greater price transparency to swaps trading.
In an OTC market, when two dealers enter into a swap contract, they commit to make a series
of payments to each other over the life of the swap. Each dealer is exposed to the risk that the other
party may default and fail to make promised payments. In a centrally cleared market, the contract
between the two dealers is replaced by two back-to-back contracts with a central counterparty
4
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(CCP). The dealers are no longer exposed to the risk of the other’s failure because each now
transacts with the CCP.
However, this arrangement takes the diffuse risk of an OTC market and concentrates it in CCPs,
potentially creating a new source of systemic risk. So long as all its counterparties survive, the
CCP faces no risk from its swaps — its payment obligations to one party are exactly offset by
its receipts from another party. But for central clearing to be effective, the CCP needs to have
adequate resources to continue to meet its obligations even if one of its counterparties defaults.
The disorderly failure of a swap CCP would be a major disruption to the financial system with
potentially severe consequences for the broader economy.
As its first line of defense, a CCP collects margin from its swap counterparties in the form of
cash or other high quality collateral. Margin — more precisely, initial margin — provides a buffer
to absorb losses the CCP might incur at the default of a counterparty. If a dealer defaults, the
CCP needs to replace its swaps with that dealer, and it may incur a cost in doing so. The initial
margin posted by each counterparty is intended to cover this cost in the event of that counterparty’s
default.
Because of limited liquidity in the market, the replacement cost is likely to be larger for a large
position by more than a proportional amount. If the CCP needs to replace a $1 billion swap, it
may find several dealers willing to trade; but if it needs to replace a $10 billion swap it may find few
willing dealers, and those that will quote a price may command a premium to take on the added
risk of the position. The consequences of this liquidity effect on margin are the focus of this paper.
An immediate implication of limited liquidity is that a CCP’s margin requirements should be
convex and, in particular, superlinear in the size of a dealer’s position. A seemingly obvious but
apparently overlooked point is that this is insufficient. The same dealer may have similar positions
at other CCPs. If the dealer goes bankrupt, all CCPs at which the dealer participates need to
close out their contracts with the dealer at the same time. The impact on market prices is driven
by the combined effect from all CCPs. If each CCP sets its margin requirements based only on
the positions it sees (as appears to be the case in practice), it underestimates the margin it needs.
This is what we call hidden illiquidity. In fact, we show that the very convexity required to capture
5
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
illiquidity creates an incentive for dealers to split their trades across multiple CCPs, amplifying the
effect.
We next examine the possibility that a CCP can compensate for the impact of positions it does
not see by charging higher margin on the positions it does see. We analyze this problem through
a model with one dealer, two CCPs, and multiple types of swaps. Given margin schedules from
the CCPs, the dealer optimizes its allocation of trades to minimize the total margin it needs to
post; given the dealer’s objective, the CCPs set their margin schedules to have enough margin to
cover the system-wide price impact should the dealer default. An equilibrium is defined by margin
schedules that meet this objective.
We derive our most explicit results when price impact is linear (so that margin requirements
are quadratic). We characterize all equilibria and show, in particular, that margin requirements
at the two CCPs need not coincide. A CCP with a steeper margin schedule gets less volume and
therefore needs to compensate more for the volume it does not see, which it does with its steeper
margin. However, we also show that a necessary condition for an equilibrium is that the two CCPs
agree on the true price impact. Without this condition, we get “a race to the bottom” in which a
CCP that views the true price impact as smaller drives out the other CCP.
We extend this result to allow CCPs to select a subset of swaps to clear. On the subset of swaps
cleared by both CCPs, the previous result applies. Equilibrium now imposes a further necessary
and sufficient condition precluding cross-swap price impacts between swaps cleared by just one
CCP and swaps cleared by the other CCP. We also consider extensions that introduce uncertainty
to the model.
We obtain partial results in the case of nonlinear price impact with a single type of swap. We
observe that the dealer’s optimization problem combines the convex marginal schedules of the two
CCPs into a single effective margin which is the inf-convolution of the individual schedules. A result
in convex analysis states that the convex conjugate of an inf-convolution of two convex functions
is the sum of the conjugates of these functions. We relate this result to conditions for equilibrium.
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1.2. Portfolio Liquidity Estimation and Optimal Execution
Estimation of liquidity costs, those associated with trading a collection of large positions, is an
important issue in modern financial markets. In portfolio management, estimation of liquidity
costs is important since these costs can be significant. This is particularly true for investors who
are very active (and hence incur significant costs by trading frequently) or are very large (and hence
incur significant costs through their size). In such settings, effective portfolio construction decisions
cannot be made without considering liquidity costs. Similarly, in risk management, assessment of
the risk associated with holding a portfolio depends on both the long-term fluctuations in the value
of the underlying assets and the short-term ability to convert the portfolio into cash. This latter
effect can be especially important in times of distress, and is fundamentally a question of liquidity
costs.
A closely related problem is that of optimal execution. In many markets, when an investor
seeks to execute a large trade (a so-called “parent order”), it is usually broken into pieces with
the help of algorithmic trading systems and executed as a sequence of much smaller trades (“child
orders”). Optimal execution problems seek to do this in the most efficient manner by balancing
two effects. First, there are transaction costs associated with execution, including, for example,
commissions, fees, the bid-ask spread, and (most importantly for large investors) the market impact
of the trading itself. Second, by spreading out a large trade over time, investors are exposed to risks
associated with the movement of market prices over the execution horizon. Traders must evaluate
their trading strategies against the transaction costs and market risks. Those who trade too fast
incur high transaction costs from market impact while those who trade too slow are exposed to
adverse price movements: both trading strategies could potentially result in more than the expected
liquidity cost. This trade-off between cost and uncertainty has given rise to a rich literature on
optimal execution in general and optimal liquidation of a single risky asset in particular, starting
with the work of Almgren and Chriss (2001).
To date, much of the literature on the estimation of liquidity costs and optimal execution has
focused on the single-asset setting (with several notable exceptions to be discussed shortly). By
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contrast, we believe that liquidity is fundamentally a multi-asset problem that must be addressed
at the portfolio level. This is for several reasons:
(i) Investors make trading decisions seldom in isolation on an asset-by-asset basis, but rather
jointly to produce a trade list consisting of a portfolio of trades to be made simultaneously in
multiple assets. A simple example would be an open-end fund, which, upon an an inflow or
outflow, would in effect trade portfolios to maintain proportional holdings. Since the market
risk associated with such a trade depends on the joint distribution of correlated assets, the
estimation of its liquidity costs will not decompose across assets, nor can optimal trading
schedules be determined by considering assets in isolation.
(ii) Even if an investor seeks to trade only a single asset, he may receive significant benefits from
simultaneously trading correlated assets for the hedging purposes. For example, an investor
unwinding a position in an illiquid asset may seek to hedge the execution risk by establishing
positions in correlated but liquid assets, in order to drive down overall liquidity costs.
(iii) Finally, investors may benefit from the multi-asset approach through the trading of what we
call liquid bundles. These are collections of assets (in effect, portfolios) existing in many mar-
kets that can be directly and atomically traded. For example, in equity markets, investors can
directly trade exchange-traded funds (ETFs), which are economically (ignoring creation and
redemption issues) equivalent to trading a basket of underlying equities. Similarly, in credit
markets, trading credit default swap (CDS) indices is equivalent to taking a simultaneous
position in a portfolio of underlying credit entities. In futures markets, spread trades, such
as calendar spreads, inter-commodity spreads (e.g., crack spreads), and option spreads, are
also portfolio trades. Such portfolio instruments can be important both because they provide
another mechanism for trading the constituent assets, and because they are often extremely
liquid and have little idiosyncratic risk, which makes them excellent candidates as the hedging
instruments.
In Chapter 3, we develop a multi-asset generalization of the model of Almgren and Chriss (2001),
building on the work of Guéant (2015), Kim (2014), and Guéant et al. (2015). Going beyond this
8
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
earlier work, our model explicitly incorporates the trading of liquid bundles such as ETFs. Our
model is easily calibrated and computationally tractable.
The most important contribution of our model, however, is that it enables us to provide a
structural analysis of the underlying drivers of liquidity costs. Specifically, we make the assumption
of a factor model, where the covariance structure across the universe of tradeable assets decomposes
into common, systemic factors (which drive correlations) and individual, idiosyncratic risk. We
consider a large-universe asymptotic regime, where a large number of assets are available for trading
relative to the number of underlying systemic factors. This large-universe setting is consistent
with asset pricing theory, particularly the assumptions made in the arbitrage pricing theory first
developed by Ross (1976). It is also consistent with the state of the art in practice, where, for
example, commercial risk models for equities (e.g., BARRA) use dozens of factors to explain the
covariance structure for thousands of assets.
In this asymptotic large-universe setting, under suitable technical assumptions, we develop
simple closed-form approximations for liquidity costs. These approximations are useful for com-
putation, but they also highlight two key structural properties of portfolio liquidity costs. First,
liquidity costs are primarily driven by idiosyncratic risk. This is because, in a large-universe setting,
systemic risk can be hedged very cheaply and nearly eliminated. Put differently, the benefit from
considering optimal execution at the portfolio level roughly corresponds to reducing risk exposure
from total risk to only idiosyncratic risk. Second, introducing a liquid bundle (ETF) is approxi-
mately equivalent to commensurately increasing the liquidity of each underlying asset by its implied
trading volume in the ETF. In other words, liquid high-volume ETFs can offer significant reductions
in liquidity costs.
We explore the practical implications of our model in an empirical example consisting of 29 U.S.
equities in the utility sector, along with a sector ETF. There, we demonstrate the above-referenced
structure effects and illustrate the magnitude of the benefits of our approach. In particular, the
portfolio approach to trading single assets in the utility sector can reduce liquidity costs by a factor
of up to five. In addition, use of the sector ETF further reduces costs by 10–20%.
Research on optimal execution has been of particular academic interest in the past two decades.
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It first started with Bertsimas and Lo (1998), who focused on the minimization of execution costs.
The trade-off between transaction cost and market risk was first documented by Grinold and Kahn
(2000), and was then used in the seminal papers of Almgren and Chriss (2001) and Almgren and
Chriss (1999) to derive the framework of single-asset optimal execution in a mean-variance formula-
tion. Initially in discrete time with linear market impact, the Almgren–Chriss model was extended
to continuous time by He and Mamaysky (2005) and Forsyth (2011) using the Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman approach, and by Almgren (2003) and Guéant (2015) using nonlinear market impact
functions. Almgren (2012) further takes into account stochastic volatility and liquidity. Whereas
these frameworks are all based on static or deterministic strategies in which the number of shares
to be sold at any time is pre-specified, Almgren and Lorenz (2007) improves on them with the more
realistic mean-variance formulation of a simple update strategy that accelerates execution when
the prices move in favor of the trader. A more detailed discussion of the form of adaptivity is given
in Lorenz and Almgren (2011).
Perhaps due to its mathematical difficulties, the portfolio approaches to optimal execution is
much less studied. Almgren and Chriss (2001), followed by Engle and Ferstenberg (2007) and
Brown et al. (2010), briefly discuss the portfolio approach and provide a solution to a simple case.
In recent years, the body of work dedicated to the portfolio approach has grown. Kim (2014)
considers the case where market impact is assumed to be minimal and decays sufficiently fast to be
negligible in price dynamics. Guéant et al. (2015) present a numerical method to approximate the
optimal execution strategy based on convex duality. While the framework used in these two papers
is quite similar to that of the present paper, our framework is more general and allows for the
trading of liquid bundles. Finally, Tsoukalas et al. (2014) analyze a multi-asset optimal execution
problem; however, they confine their attention to the microstructure of cross-asset market impact.
One key observation to be drawn from all these papers is that there are large hedging benefits by
using the portfolio approach.
Our research is also related to empirical research that conduct cross-sectional regressions to
estimate market impacts. For example, Chacko et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence that the
expected market impact is proportional to the square root of the trading size; see also Bouchaud
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et al. (2008). However, this approach has two downsides: it is extremely noisy (because it is hard
to estimate transaction costs from actual returns) and from our perspective, it is fundamentally a
single-asset approach.
1.3. A Model for Queue Position Valuation
Modern financial markets are predominantly electronic. In modern exchanges, market participants
interact with each other through computer algorithms and electronic orders. The image of traders
frantically gesturing and yelling to each other on the trading floor has largely given way to im-
personal computer terminals. In terms of market structure, the electronic limit order book (LOB)
has become dominant for certain asset classes such as equities and futures in the United States.
Figure 1.1 illustrates how a limit order book works. It is presented as a collection of resting limit
orders, each of which specifies a quantity to be traded and the worst acceptable price. The limit or-
ders will be matched for execution with market orders3 which demand immediate liquidity. Traders
can therefore either provide liquidity to the market by placing these limit orders or take liquidity
from it by submitting market orders to buy or sell a specified quantity.
Most limit order books are operated under the rule of price-time priority, that is used to
determine how limit orders are prioritized for execution. First of all, limit orders are sorted by the
price and higher priority is given to the orders at the best prices, i.e., the order to buy at the highest
price or the order to sell at the lowest price. Orders at the same price are ranked depending on
when they entered the queue according to a first-in-first-out (FIFO) rule. Therefore, as soon as a
new market order enters the trading system, it searches the order book and automatically executes
against limit orders with the highest priority. More than one transaction can be generated as the
market order may run through multiple subsequent limit orders.4 In fact, the FIFO discipline
suggests that the dynamics of a limit order book resembles a queueing system in the sense that
limit orders wait in the queue to be filled by market orders (or canceled). Prices are typically
3We do not make a distinction between market orders and marketable limit orders.
4There is an alternative rule called pro-rata, which works by allocating trades proportionally across orders at the
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Figure 1.1: An illustration of a limit order book.
discrete in limit order books and there is a minimum increment of price which is referred to as
tick size. If the tick size is small relative to the asset price, traders can obtain priority by slightly
improving the order price. But it becomes difficult when the tick size is economically significant.
As a result, queueing position becomes important as traders prefer to stay in the queue and wait
for their turn of execution.
High-level decision problems such as market making and optimal execution are of great interest
in both academia and industry. One of the decisions raised by those problems is when to use limit
orders as opposed to market orders and how to place limit orders if they are preferred. The key
ingredient of that decision is the estimation of the value of a limit order. In Chapter 4, we try to
relate the value of a limit order to its queue position. We claim that queue positions are relevant
and indeed positions at the front of the queue are very valuable for the following reasons. First
of all, good queue positions guarantee early execution and less waiting time. This is particularly
important for algorithmic traders who potentially have a large number of trades scheduled to be
executed. Additionally, less waiting time can translate to a higher fill rate, because there is less
chance that the market price will move away while the limit orders are sitting in the queue. Second,
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good queue positions also mean few adverse selection costs. Orders at the end of a large queue will
be executed in the next instance only against large trades. On the other hand, orders at the very
front of the queue will be executed against the next trade no matter what its size will be. Large
trades often originate from informed traders who are confident about the trades’ profitability. In
this way, a good queue position acts as a filter on the population of contra-side market orders so
that the liquidity provider is less likely to be disadvantaged by trading against informed traders.
This relationship between queue positions and adverse selection is first documented in Glosten
(1994), which considers a single-period setting.
In practice, we have seen investors expend huge amounts of money trying to take advantage
of better queue positions in the limit order book. For example, there has been controversy in
recent years over exotic order types on certain exchanges that allow traders to attain priority in
the limit order book. These exotic order types “allow high-speed trading firms to trade ahead
of less-sophisticated investors, potentially disadvantaging them and violating regulatory rules.” 5
This shows that there is indeed value in queue positions, as sophisticated investors are interested
in paying to get better queue positions. Another example is that there has been an “arms race”
between high-frequency traders to invest in technologies for low-latency trading, and part of the
driver for low-latency trading is getting good queue positions. In fact, one situation where it is
important to trade quickly is the moment right after a price change. For example, when a trade
wipes out the current ask and the price is about to tick up, there will be a race to establish queue
positions at the new price.
In the literature, some earlier work, such as that of Glosten (1994), has implications about the
value of queue positions. Although these models point out the importance of adverse selection,
they are fundamentally static models in which the value of the order is assumed to be determined
by whether it will be executed by the next trade or not. In the presence of a large queue, the life
cycle of the order will not end with the next trade and traders will not cancel and resubmit their
limit orders after every single trade. What is more likely to happen is that the order will move up in
5Patterson, S. and Strasburg, J., “For Superfast Stock Traders, a Way to Jump Ahead in Line.” The Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 19, 2012.
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the queue, if not executed by the next trade. Actually, one way of getting to the front of the queue
eventually is to join the queue right now. Therefore there is value in moving up in the queue, and
that value may accrue over a number of trades and cancellations. As a result, aside from adverse
selection, there should be another dynamic component that can capture the optionality associated
with future value that accrues by locking in a given queue position. In order to account for this
dynamic component, a multi-period model is needed.
In Chapter 4, we provide a dynamic model for valuing limit orders in large-tick stocks based
on their relative queue positions. We appear to be one of the first to study the limit-order-book
queueing value through the lens of dynamic multi-period model. Our model identifies two important
components of positional value. First, there is a static component that relates to the adverse-
selection costs originating from the possibility of information-motivated trades. We capture the
fact that adverse selection costs are increasing with queue position. Second, there is also a dynamic
component that captures the value of positional improvement that accrues after order-book events
such as trades and cancellations.
By making reasonable simplifications, we provide a tractable way to predict order value at
different positions in the queue as a function of market primitives. We then empirically calibrate
our model in a subset of U.S. equities and find that queue values can be very significant in large-tick
assets. Additionally, we validate our model by checking the model-free estimates of queue values
using a backtesting technique.
There are many higher-level decision problems that have an ingredient of valuing limit orders.
One such example is that market makers need to constantly value limit orders in order to come
up with the optimal order-placing strategy. Another example is that in the optimal execution of
a large block, algorithmic traders often have to decide between market orders and limit orders. In
both cases, we need to value the limit orders and use them as building blocks for the higher-level
control problem. What we observe empirically in our model is that queue positions do matter
and that positional value is roughly of the same magnitude for large-tick assets. As a result, queue




Our work builds on the classical financial economics literature on market microstructure that
studies the informational motives of trading. Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) were
among the first to recognize the importance of adverse selection in analyzing the price impact of
trades and the spread, by assuming competitive suppliers of liquidity. Both of their models highlight
the fact that the possibility of trading against an informed trader creates incentives for liquidity
providers to charge additional premiums. However, these models do not consider queueing effect.
Glosten (1994) further extended this type of model, with implications for valuing orders in the
limit order book. One contribution of the paper is that it states that in cases where the prices are
discrete, the queue length should be determined by the fact that the value of the last order in the
queue is zero. Basically, the investor putting in the marginal order should be indifferent between
joining the queue or not. While the paper does not explicitly model the value of queue positions,6
it does manage to relate queue length to order values. Moreover, the model in Glosten (1994) is a
single-period static model in which the order values are calculated toward the next trade. However,
what’s more likely is that an order will move up in the queue if it is not executed. Our model
incorporates the dynamic values embedded in the queue position improvement. Additionally, by
considering a dynamic model, we are also able to consider order book events such as cancellations.
As a result, queue position actually matters in our model, and is clearly correlated with the order
values. For example, if the queue position is decreasing, then either there is a trade or people are
canceling, and either event conveys information about asset value.
Recently, there has been a growing literature from the financial engineering community on the
development of queueing models that solve various kinds of problems regarding limit order books
while recognizing that the price-time priority structure in the limit order books can be modeled
as a multi-class queueing system. Cont et al. (2010) was the first to model the limit order book
as a continuous-time Markov model that tracks the limit orders at each price level. By assuming
that order flows can be described as Poisson processes, the authors provided a parametric way
to calculate the conditional probability of various order book events such as the probability of
executing an order before a change in price. Cont and De Larrard (2013) further modeled the
6In fact, the paper assumes that competing limit orders in the same queue are executed in a pro-rata fashion.
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order-book events in a Markovian queueing system, and studied the endogenous price dynamics
resulting from executions. Lakner et al. (2013) studied a similar setup but focused on the high-
frequency regime where the arrival rate of both limit orders and market orders is large. Blanchet
and Chen (2013) derived a continuous-time model for the joint evolution of the mid price and the
bid-ask spread. Several papers such as Guo et al. (2013), Cont and Kukanov (2013), and Maglaras
et al. (2015) have been working on optimizing trading decisions in the context of a queueing model
for the limit order book. More specifically, Guo et al. (2013) proposed a model to optimally place
orders, given price impact. Cont and Kukanov (2013) derived the optimal split between limit and
market orders across multiple exchanges. Maglaras et al. (2015) studied optimal decision making in
the placement of limit orders as well as in trying to execute a large trade over a fixed time horizon.
Avellaneda et al. (2011) tried to forecast the price change based on order-book imbalance, while
in our settings price changes are exogenous. However, the limitation of the queueing literature is
that it lacks the informational component of adverse selection. And yet an important ingredient in
modeling the positional value of limit orders is the concept of adverse selection, i.e., of a correlation
between trades and prices. Our model tries to bridge this gap by considering the economics of
adverse selection in a queueing framework.
From the empirical front, there is a significant body of literature conducting empirical analyses
of the dynamics of limit order books in major exchanges. Bouchaud et al. (2006) showed that the
random-walk nature of traded prices is nontrivial. Biais et al. (1995) and Griffiths et al. (2000)
studied the limit-order submission under different market conditions. Hollifield et al. (2004) further
stated that optimal order submission depends not only on the valuation of the assets but also on
the trade-offs between order prices, execution probabilities, and picking-off risks.
There are several successful examples of modeling the optionality embedded in limit orders.
Copeland and Galai (1983) argued that informed traders are willing to pay a “fee” to obtain
immediacy in trading with liquidity providers. Chacko et al. (2008) further modeled limit orders
as American options that require delivery of the underlying shares upon execution. However, these
models are fundamentally static in that they do not explicitly model the queue positions.
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Chapter 2
Hidden Illiquidity with Multiple Central
Counterparties
2.1. Introduction
The world of swap trading has shifted from unregulated bilateral contracts that traded over-the-
counter (OTC) to back-to-back contracts that are cleared by a central counterparty (CCP). In this
setup, the CCPs always have a net position of zero by construction, as its payment obligations to
one party are exactly offset by its receipts from another party. However, a CCP is still subject
to the failure of its counterparties, which may create a source of systemic risk. Therefore, a CCP
collects margins from its counterparties to absorb potential losses from the default.
Every time when the market is going up or down, the CCP is collecting variation margins from
the clearing memeber to compensate. At the point of the default, the CCP will be holding just
enough cash from that clearing member to cover the full value of its portfolio. Since the CCP is
not allowed to hold position, it need to find a new counterparty to take over the position of the
failing clearing member. This process, however, is often costly. To cover the replacement cost, the
CCP charges initial margin according to the clearing positions.
Given limited liquidity in the market, this replacement cost can be enormous and superlinear
in the size of the position. The key idea in this analysis is that margin requirement need to cover
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the replacement cost, and therefore need to grow superlinearly with position size. In the presense
of multiple central counterparties, the very fact that CCPs have to set the right amount of initial
margin according to superlinear liquidity charges creates the incentive for dealers to split their
positions among multiple CCPs. Therefore, each CCP clears only a fraction of the dealer’s total
position. And since each CCP charges margins based on the potential impact from the default of
a clearing member and the subsequent liquidation of a large position, swaps dealers are effectively
“hiding” potential liquidation costs. We investigate the CCP’s optimal strategy in a systemic way
and acknowledge that this will not work if different CCPs have different views on the “right” amount
of margin. As a result, a lack of coordination among CCPs can lead to a “race to the bottom”
because CCPs with lower perceived liquidation costs can drive competitors out of the market.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides some background on central
clearing. Section 2.3 introduces the notion of hidden illiquidity. Section 2.4 introduces our model
and our definition of equilibrium. Section 2.5 considers the case of linear price impact, including
a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium and an analysis of what happens when the
condition fails to hold. In Section 2.6, we extend the model to include uncertainty. In Section 2.7,
we analyze nonlinear price impact in the case of a single type of instrument. Section 2.8 concludes
and provides practical implications of our analysis. Most proofs appear in the appendix.
2.2. Background on Central Clearing
Figure 2.1 illustrates the difference between an over-the-counter market and a centrally cleared
market. In part (a) of the figure, dealers A, B, and C trade bilaterally. They initiate trades
directly with each other, and each pair of dealers manages payments on its swaps.
The numbers in part (a) of the figure show hypothetical payments due between dealers. Dealers
may have multiple swaps with each other — indeed, the number of contracts would typically be
very large — leading to payment obligations in both directions. The total payments due at any
point in time may be viewed as a measure of the total counterparty risk in the system. In the
figure, the total comes to 42.
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(a) Over-the-counter market 
(b) Over-the-counter market 
with bilateral netting 
(c) Centrally cleared market 
Figure 2.1: (a) Payment obligations in an OTC market. (b) Payment obligations after bilateral netting.
(c) Payment obligations in a centrally cleared market.
Bilateral netting between pairs of dealers can greatly reduce total counterparty risk. Part (b)
of Figure 2.1 shows the result of bilateral netting of payment obligations. Total payments have
been reduced to 20. In fact, further netting is still possible — in particular, dealer C makes a net
payment of zero. However, further netting would require coordination among all three dealers and
cannot be achieved bilaterally.
Part (c) of the figure illustrates a market with a central counterparty (CCP). After two dealers
agree to enter into a swap, their bilateral contract is replaced by two mirror-image contracts running
through the CCP.1 Whatever payments dealer B would have made to dealer A it makes instead
to the CCP. The CCP in turn assumes responsibility for making the payments that A would have
received from B. With all the contracts from part (a) of the figure running through a single CCP,
central clearing achieves maximal netting in part (c) of the figure, reducing the total payments due
1Only clearing members of a CCP can trade through the CCP. We will informally refer to the parties to swaps
as dealers or clearing members, but strictly speaking a dealer need not be a clearing member and a clearing member
need not be a dealer.
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to 8. This reduction in system-wide counterparty risk is one of the main arguments for central
clearing. Moreover, the CCP theoretically always has a net risk of zero in the sense that the total
payments it needs to make on swaps equal the total payments it is owed.
This simple example overstates the benefits of central clearing in several respects. Dealers
engaged in different types of OTC swaps — interest rate swaps and credit default swaps, for
example — can net bilateral payments across all swaps; so, if different types of swaps are cleared
through different CCPs, central clearing can actually reduce the total amount of netting. (See
Duffie and Zhu (2011) and Cont and Kokholm (2014) for more on this comparison.) Some of the
multilateral netting benefit provided by a CCP can be achieved in an OTC market through third-
party trade compression services. In both OTC and centrally cleared markets, dealers provide
collateral for their payment obligations, which reduces the counterparty risk that remains from any
unnetted exposures. With central clearing, the CCP faces risk from the default of a dealer because
of the costs it may incur in replacing or unwinding positions after the dealer fails.
This last point motivates our analysis so we discuss it in further detail. To protect itself from
the failure of a clearing member, the CCP collects two types of margin payments from each member
on at least a daily basis, variation margin and initial margin. Variation margin reflects daily price
changes in a clearing member’s swaps. If the market value of the member’s swaps decreases, the
member makes a variation margin payment to the CCP; if the market value increases, the CCP
credits the member’s variation margin account. At the time of a clearing member’s default, the
variation margin collected by the CCP should offset the value of the clearing member’s position.
Figure 2.2, based on a similar figure in Murphy (2012), illustrates the two types of margin. The
figure shows the hypothetical evolution of the value of a clearing member’s swap portfolio over time,
from the perspective of the CCP. The value may be positive or negative. In the figure, the clearing
member fails at a time when its swaps have positive value to the CCP. The variation margin held
by the CCP allows the CCP to recover this value upon the clearing member’s failure.
However, the CCP cannot instantly replace or liquidate the failed member’s positions. Suppose,
for example, that dealer B in Figure 2.1 had a single swap, originally entered into with dealer A
and subsequently cleared through the CCP. If dealer B fails, the CCP has to continue to meet its
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Figure 2.2: Variation margin covers the value of a clearing member’s swap portfolio at the time of
default. Initial margin should cover costs the CCP may incur from the time of default to the completion
of the close-out of defaulting member’s portfolio.
payment obligations to dealer A. In order to do so, it needs to replace the position held by B.
Replacing dealer B’s position may take several days. During this time, the market value of the
position will continue to move, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The value of the CCP’s claim on dealer
B is also the value of dealer A’s claim on the CCP. An increase in the market value after B’s failure,
as illustrated in the figure, represents a loss to the CCP. The initial margin collected by the CCP
is intended to protect the CCP from such losses. Moreover, when the CCP transacts it incurs the
cost of the bid-ask spread. This cost should also be covered by the initial margin.
For purposes of illustration, Figure 2.2 shows the change in market value and the bid-ask spread
as two separate contributions to the total cost incurred by the CCP. In fact, the two sources of
loss are entangled. If the CCP transacts more quickly, buying and selling large positions, it will
face lower market risk but incur higher liquidity costs through wider bid-ask spreads. It can try to
reduce liquidity costs by breaking the failed member’s positions into smaller pieces and replacing
them more slowly. In doing so, it faces greater market risk. See Avellaneda and Cont (2013) for an
analysis of a CCP’s optimal liquidation problem.
Larger transactions face wider bid-ask spreads per dollar traded. As a consequence, liquidity
costs increase superlinearly in the size of a position. Initial margin must then also grow superlinearly
to cover liquidity costs with high probability. Hull (2012) calls this the size effect.
We will argue, however, that superlinear margin requirements create an incentive for a dealer
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to split trades across multiple CCPs. If the dealer fails, all CCPs through which it trades will
need to replace the dealer’s positions at the same time. Their liquidation costs will be driven by
the total size of the dealer’s positions across all CCPs. If each CCP bases its margin requirements
solely on the trades it clears, without considering trades by the same dealer at other CCPs, it will
underestimate the margin it needs to cover liquidation costs.
In addition to variation margin and initial margin, clearing members make contributions to a
CCP’s guarantee fund. If a clearing member defaults, any losses exceeding that member’s margin
are first absorbed by the member’s guarantee fund contribution, then by CCP capital, and then
by the guarantee fund contributions of surviving members. However, initial margin is required
to cover liquidation costs with 99 percent confidence under US regulations (Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, 2011, p. 69368–69370), or 99.5 percent under EMIR (European Commission,
2013, p. 56), so our analysis will focus on the adequacy of the margin collected.
Other work on CCP margins includes Cruz Lopez et al. (2013) and Menkveld (2014), both of
which focus on dependence between the trades of members of a single CCP. Amini et al. (2013)
consider the impact of central clearing on overall systemic risk. Capponi et al. (2014) examine
concentration in CCP membership. Biais et al. (2012) study the incentives created by loss mutu-
alization in a CCP. Pirrong (2009) provides a detailed critique of central clearing.
2.3. Hidden Illiquidity
We contrast margin requirements based solely on market risk with requirements that reflect liquidity
costs. We assume that the CCP is able to collect variation margin to cover routine daily price
changes, so by “margin” we mean initial margin.
We consider a dealer that is a clearing member of K identical CCPs. Each CCP clears m types
of swaps. These could be credit default swaps (CDS) on different reference entities or with different
terms, or they could be different types of interest rate swaps. A vector x ∈ Rm records the dealer’s
swap portfolio, with the `th component of x measuring the size of a dealer’s position in swaps of
type `, ` = 1, . . . ,m.
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To clear a vector of swaps x, each CCP collects margin f(x), for some margin function f : Rm →
R+ that is common to all CCPs. We allow the dealer to divide the position vector x arbitrarily
among the K CCPs, clearing the vector xi through the ith CCP, with x1 + · · · + xK = x. To







∣∣∣∣∣ subject to x1 + · · ·+ xK = x
}
. (2.1)
A margin requirement for market risk alone seeks to cover the 99th or 99.5th percentile of a
portfolio’s change in market value between the time of default and the end of the close-out period
indicated in Figure 2.2, ignoring liquidity costs. The close-out period is typically assumed to be
five to ten days. The percentile can be approximated as a multiple of the standard deviation of the
change in value over this period. If we let Σ denote the m×m covariance matrix of price changes
for the m types of swaps over the close-out period, then we can define a margin requirement to
cover market risk by setting
f(x) , a(x>Σx)1/2, (2.2)
for some multiplier a.
With this choice of f , the dealer could optimally clear the entire portfolio x through a single
CCP. Sending x/K to each CCP is also optimal, but the dealer receives the full benefit of diversifi-
cation through a single CCP — there is no incentive for the dealer to split the position. Moreover,
if the dealer does split the position, each CCP receives the margin it needs to cover the market risk
it faces, assuming a and Σ are chosen correctly.
The margin function in (2.2) is convex but it scales linearly in position size: for any x ∈ Rm
and any λ ≥ 0, f(λx) = λf(x). In other words, this f is positively homogeneous. As discussed in
the previous section, the margin function needs to increase superlinearly in position size to cover
liquidity costs. For example, consider
f(x) , a(x>Σx)α/2, α > 1. (2.3)
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This margin function yields f(λx) = λαf(x) for any x ∈ Rm and λ ≥ 0, so it does indeed grow
superlinearly along the direction of any portfolio vector x. In this case, solving (2.1) requires
clearing an equal portion x/K through each CCP. Superlinear margin creates an incentive for
the dealer to distribute the position as widely as possible. More generally, we have the following
contrast between two types of margin functions.
Proposition 1. Suppose the function f satisfies f(0) = 0. Then:
(i) If f has the following two properties,
(a) Subadditivity: f(x+ y) ≤ f(x) + f(y), for all x, y ∈ Rm,
(b) Positive homogeneity: f(λx) = λf(x), for all x ∈ Rm, λ ≥ 0,
then any allocation of the form xi = bix, with b1 + · · · + bK = 1 and bi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,K,
solves (2.1). In particular, clearing the full portfolio x through a single CCP is optimal.
(ii) If f is strictly convex, then an equal split xi = x/K, i = 1, . . . ,K, is the only optimal solution
to (2.1). Furthermore, the margin requirement is superlinear in the sense that f(λx) > λf(x),
for all x ∈ Rm, x 6= 0, and all λ > 0.
















for any vector b ≥ 0 satisfying b1 + · · ·+ bK = 1 and any x1, . . . , xK ∈ Rm feasible for (2.1).













The inequality is strict when the vectors {xi} are not identical. 
We can say more if we specialize to a price impact formulation of liquidity costs. Suppose f
takes the form
f(x) , x>F (x), (2.4)
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where F : Rm → Rm satisfies F (0) = 0 and is increasing. Interpret F (x) as the impact on the
market price of closing out a position x. Then, x>F (x) is the cost incurred as a result of this price
impact on the portfolio x.
Suppose f in (2.4) is strictly convex, so the dealer optimally splits its position evenly across
CCPs. Each CCP collects x>F (x/K)/K in margin. If the dealer fails and all CCPs liquidate their
identical positions, the total price impact is F (x), so each CCP incurs a cost of x>F (x)/K, which
is larger than the margin it collected. The strict convexity of f motivates the dealer to “hide” part
of its position from each CCP and, moreover, leaves each CCP with insufficient margin.
If all CCPs have the same margin function, they can eliminate the problem by charging
f(x) , x>F (Kx).
In other words, they can precisely compensate for the hidden illiquidity by overstating the cost of
liquidating the positions they clear. Clearing regulations2 require CCPs to back test their margin
requirements against historical data. But this simple result implies that a properly calibrated
margin model will understate the required margin, unless each CCP considers the simultaneous
effects of other CCPs in its analysis. Although they are lengthy and detailed, procedures for
swap CCPs adopted by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (2011) and the European
Commission (2013) do not address the need to consider the effect of a member’s default at other
CCPs, nor is this point noted in the influential CPSS-IOSCO (2012) principles. In Section 2.5.2, we
will see that compensating for the effects of other CCPs may be difficult if the CCPs have different
margin models and, more importantly, different views on price impact.
In practice, a dealer faces many considerations in making its clearing decisions, beyond the
margin minimization decision reflected in (2.1), including the following:
◦ The dealer faces a sequential allocation problem, with new trades arriving over time and old
trades maturing.
◦ Both parties to a swap need to agree on where the swap will be cleared, and their optimal
2See Commodity Futures Trading Commission (2011, p. 69372–69374) or European Commission (2013, p. 65–66).
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allocations may differ. In order to clear at a given CCP, both parties need to be members of
the CCP or trade through members of the CCP.
◦ Clearing members clear trades for clients as well as for their own accounts, and this limits
their ability to subdivide positions.
◦ Dealers may prefer one CCP over another for reasons unrelated to margin requirements,
including, for example, lower clearing fees, greater netting benefits, greater CCP capital to
absorb losses, better capitalized clearing members, and differences in regulatory jurisdictions.
Currently, when multiple CCPs clear an instrument, one CCP typically clears a large fraction
of the overall volume.
These factors may prevent a dealer from allocating trades uniformly to minimize margin but they
do not remove the incentive for the dealer to split positions to the extent possible when margin
charges are strictly convex.
The precise margin models used by individual CCPs are proprietary. However, the following
excerpt from an industry magazine (Ivanov and Underwood, 2011, p. 32) supports our analysis.
The article describes the margin methodology at ICE Clear Credit, the largest CCP for credit
default swaps:
“For portfolio/concentration risks, large position requirements, also known as concentra-
tion charges, apply to long and short protection positions that exceed predefined notional
threshold levels. The concentration charge threshold reflects market depth and liquidity
for the specific index family or reference entity. Positions that exceed selected thresholds
are subject to additional, exponentially increasing, initial margin requirements. The
accelerated initial margin creates the economic incentive to eliminate large positions.”
Whether the model literally uses an exponential margin function or if this term is used informally
to refer to a superlinear increase is unclear.
We should also comment on the degree of liquidity in swaps markets. The most liquid interest
rate swaps and index CDS are already centrally cleared. As new types of contracts migrate to CCPs,
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they are inevitably less liquid, particularly at the outset. Swaptions and inflation swaps have been
proposed for central clearing but are far less liquid than standard interest rate swaps. Even among
index CDS, off-the-run indices are significantly less liquid than their on-the-run versions. Each
index CDS trades at multiple maturities, and liquidity is much lower at maturities other than
five years. Chen et al. (2011) provide a detailed analysis of liquidity in CDS transactions using
supervisory data. We make some observations using public data.
Figure 2.3 shows the notional amount outstanding and gross market value of CDS from 2005
to 2013, as reported by the Bank for International Settlements. Both measures show declining
liquidity in the CDS market following the financial crisis. Higher bank capital requirements for
derivatives have contributed to this trend.
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of the average number of trades per day for all single-name
CDS, as reported by the Depository Trust Clearing Corporation. The figure shows data for the
first quarter of 2013. The vast majority of contracts trade at most a few times per day.
Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of bid-ask spreads for one-year and five-year CDS, as reported
by Markit Group, Ltd. The figures show the bid-ask spreads for all single-name contracts for
all days in 2013, except that we dropped the top ten percent (the widest spreads) in both cases.
The distribution for five-year contracts shows large spikes near five and ten basis points. For the
one-year contracts the spreads are much wider, reflecting the lower liquidity at that maturity.
2.4. Model
We now turn to a setting with K = 2 CCPs. We assume that both CCPs clear a universe of m
types of swaps. We consider a dealer that is a clearing member of both CCPs and whose portfolio
is described by the vector x ∈ Rm.
We will measure the liquidation costs associated with a portfolio using price impact functions,
defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Price Impact Function). A price impact function is a function F : Rm → Rm satisfying
the following conditions:
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Figure 2.3: Aggregate CDS market statistics (2005–2013).
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of average number of daily CDS trades per reference entity (Q1, 2013).
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Figure 2.5: Histogram of bid-ask spreads for CDS (2013).
(i) F (0) = 0,
(ii) F is differentiable,
(iii) the map x 7→ x>F (x) is strictly convex over x ∈ Rm.
Here, F (x) captures the vector of price changes that would occur given the liquidation of the
portfolio x. Specifically, the `th component of the vector F (x) represents the price change to swap
` given the liquidation of a portfolio x. Condition (i) requires that if no portfolio is liquidated, then
there is no price impact. Condition (ii) will be convenient for technical reasons. Condition (iii)
requires that the margin costs associated with the liquidation of a portfolio be increasing with the
portfolio size.
We assume that the ith CCP believes that price impact is given by a price impact function
Gi : Rm → Rm. We further assume that the ith CCP charges margin as a function of only the
portfolio xi ∈ Rm cleared there by the clearing member. This is done according to an alternative
price impact function Fi : Rm → Rm. In other words, for clearing the portfolio xi, the ith CCP
charges initial margin according to the schedule
fi(xi) , x>i Fi(xi).
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The clearing member will divide the overall portfolio x in order to minimize the total initial
margin outlay. Given margin schedules {f1, f2}, this involves solving the optimization problem
feff(x) , minimize
x1,x2∈Rm
{f1(x1) + f2(x2) | subject to x1 + x2 = x} . (2.5)
Here, the optimal value feff(x) is the effective margin function experienced a clearing member that
optimally divides its portfolio across the CCPs.
Given the liquidation of the portfolio x, each CCP should ensure that enough margin is collected
to cover liquidation costs. Given that the ith CCP believes that the price movement from the
liquidation of the overall portfolio will be given by the vector G(x), CCP i will incur liquidation
costs of x>i Gi(x) on the sub-portfolio xi it clears. Therefore, for CCP i to collect sufficient margin,
it is necessary that
x>i Fi(xi) ≥ x>i Gi(x). (2.6)
We will assume that the market is competitive, so the CCPs seek to collect no more initial margin
than is necessary to cover liquidation costs. In other words, we will replace the inequality in (2.6)
with equality.
Combining the various considerations described above, we define an equilibrium between the
clearing member, which seeks to minimize its margin requirements, and the CCPs, which seek to
collect sufficient margin to cover liquidation costs, as follows:
Definition 2 (Equilibrium). Given price impact beliefs G1, G2 for the two CCPs, an equilibrium
(F1, F2, x1, x2) is defined by
1. allocation functions xi : Rm → Rm, for i ∈ {1, 2},
2. price impact functions Fi : Rm → Rm, for i ∈ {1, 2},





is an optimal solution to the clearing member’s problem (2.5),
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= xi(x)>Gi(x), for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Definition 2 makes explicit the functional dependence of the allocations x1 and x2 on the
portfolio x. In what follows, we will sometimes suppress this dependence for notational convenience.
2.5. Linear Price Impact
We first consider the case of linear price impact functions, where we require that the price impact
functions associated with each CCP satisfy
Fi(x) = Fix, Gi(x) = Gix, (2.7)
for some matrices Fi, Gi ∈ Rm×m. Without loss of generality, we will require that the matrices
Fi, Gi be symmetric.3 Moreover, in order to satisfy Part (iii) of Definition 1, we require that
Fi, Gi  0, i.e., that the matrices are positive definite.
Given linear price impact (2.7), the total margin charged by each CCP i takes the form
fi(x) = x>Fix,
i.e., the CCP margins charged are quadratic in the position cleared. This is a multivariate version of
the Kyle (1985) model, in which price impact is linear and the total liquidation costs are quadratic.
A linear price impact model accommodates cross-price impact: the (k, `) entry of a linear price
impact matrix captures the effect of liquidating the `th instrument on the price of the kth in-
strument. Cross-price impact is important in situations where transactions in one swap propagate
to the prices of other swaps. This can occur for supply/demand reasons (e.g., when similar in-
3For any matrix F ∈ Rm×m, x>Fx = x>(F + F>)x/2 for all x ∈ Rm. Hence, if a price impact matrix F
is non-symmetric, we can replace it with its symmetrization (F + F>)/2 without changing the resulting margin
function.
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(b) Sovereign CDS (n = 93)
Figure 2.6: Variance explained by the first 10 principal components of covariance matrices.
struments function as partial substitutes) or for informational reasons (e.g., when the underlying
fundamental values of related instruments are correlated). For example, CDS for different firms in
the same sector can be impacted by common liquidity or price shocks, as are CDS for the same
reference entity across various tenors, or CDS for different series of a common index.
Direct estimation of price impact functions requires detailed transaction data and can be quite
challenging.4 To get a rough indication of the potential for cross-price impact, we can examine
comovements in credit default swaps. Figure 2.6 shows the variance explained by the first 10
principal components of the covariance matrices of daily CDS returns for financial institutions
(left) and sovereigns (right). In both cases, a relatively small number of principal components
explains a significant fraction of total variance. This suggests significant cross-price impact within
each sector.
2.5.1. Equilibrium Characterization
In the case of linear price impact functions, the following theorem characterizes possible equilibria:
4See Fleming and Sarkar (2014) for an analysis of the failure resolution of Lehman Brothers, including its cleared
swaps.
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Theorem 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with linear
price impact functions is that the two CCPs have common views on market impact, i.e., that
G1 = G2 , G.
In this case, all equilibria are determined by the symmetric, positive definite solutions F1, F2 ∈
Rm×m to the equation
G−1 = F−11 + F−12 . (2.8)
Theorem 1 generates two important insights. First, in order for an equilibrium to exist, the
CCPs must agree on the true price impact G. In Section 2.5.2, we will show that different beliefs
about the true price impact can create a “race to the bottom” in which one CCP is driven out of
the market.
The second insight of Theorem 1 is that the CCPs need not charge the same margin in equilib-
rium. There are many possible equilibria, corresponding to solutions of (2.8). To interpret (2.8),




x>1 F1x1 + x>2 F2x2
∣∣∣ subject to x1 + x2 = x}
= minimize
x1∈Rm






Under condition (2.8), then, we have that feff(x) = x>Gx. In other words, the equilibrium condition
is equivalent to the requirement that the effective margin experienced by an optimizing clearing
member correspond to the margin that would be charged by a single CCP under the common price
impact belief G.






1− α, α ∈ (0, 1).
When α = 1/2, each CCP charges according to twice its true belief, and each clears half of the
clearing member’s portfolio. This corresponds to the equilibrium discussed in Section 2.3. If
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Figure 2.7: Margin requirements combine like resistors connected in parallel.
α < 1/2, CCP 1 will attract less than half of the portfolio because it has a higher margin charge,
so it needs to compensate more for the part of the portfolio it does not see, which it precisely
accomplishes through its higher margin charge.
Notice that, in out setting, G−1∆p is the size of the portfolio required to achieve a price
movement ∆p ∈ Rm. In this way, G−1 is analogous to the “market depth” of Kyle (1985). Thus
Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows: in an equilibrium we require that the two CCPs agree on
the true market depth, and that the total depth provided by the two CCPs match the true depth.
Further, the operation (F1, F2) 7→ (F−11 + F−12 )−1 is called the “parallel sum” of matrices in
Anderson and Duffin (1969) and a subsequent literature. The name is based on an analogy with
how resistors combine when connected in parallel in a circuit. To make the analogy in our setting
(see Figure 2.7), identify the price impact used by each CCP with resistance, identify the size of
the clearing member’s trade with current, and identify the total price impact with voltage.
With more than two CCPs, the obvious extension of (2.8) remains sufficient for an equilibrium.
However, we do not know if agreement on the Gi remains necessary in that case.
2.5.2. Race to the Bottom
Theorem 1 establishes that there can be no equilibrium with linear price impact functions if the
CCPs have differing beliefs of price impact. In order to provide intuition for why this is the case,
it is useful to analyze the best response dynamics between competing CCPs in this setting.
Specifically, consider a discrete time setting indexed by t = 0, 1, . . ., where CCPs sequentially
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update their margin requirements as follows:
1. At time t = 0, each CCP i sets margins according to its initial beliefs by setting Fi(0) , Gi.



























, CCP 1 sets its price impact matrix
F1(t+ 1) for the next period to ensure that it would get sufficient margin for the present
allocation by solving
x1(t)>G1x = x1(t)>F1(t+ 1)x1(t).














Since this must hold for all x, and since we require that Fi(t+ 1) be symmetric, it must
































First, consider the scalar, single-instrument case (m = 1). Suppose the CCPs disagree in their
price impact beliefs and, without loss of generality, G1 > G2, so CCP 1 believes the price impact
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where the first equality follows from (2.10)–(2.11) and the second equality follows by induction. As










In other words, asymptotically, CCP 2 clears a larger fraction of the position by charging lower
margin. Due to the convexity of the quadratic total margin function, this forces CCP 1 to charge
increasingly higher margins in order to cover liquidation costs. Asymptotically, CCP 1 has an
infinite initial margin and is thus driven out of the clearing market. We call this a “race to the
bottom” because the CCP with the lower price impact ultimately determines margin costs for the
entire market.
More generally, we can expand our discussion above to the multidimensional case:




F1(t+ 1), F2(t+ 1)
)
defined in (2.10)–(2.11) are positive definite for all t ≥ 0,
(ii) if the spectral radius of G−11 G2 is strictly less than 1, as t→∞,
F2(t)F1(t)−1 → 0, x1(t)→ 0, x2(t)→ x.
Part (i) shows that the best response dynamics suggested earlier are well-defined for all t ≥ 0.
Part (ii) states that, if the price impact beliefs of CCP 2 are “smaller” (in the sense of the spectral
radius of their ratio) than those of CCP 1, CCP 1 will ultimately be driven out of the clearing
market. If G1  G2 in the positive definite ordering, i.e., if the margin required by the matrix G1
dominates that of G2 for every portfolio, then the spectral radius of G−11 G2 must be less than 1
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and part (ii) applies.
2.5.3. Partitioned Clearing
Thus far, we have assumed that both CCPs clear the entire universe of available instruments. But
the first decision a CCP makes is which types of instruments to clear. We now extend Theorem 1
by expanding the strategy space for each CCP to include the choice of instruments to clear as well
as the initial margin to charge. We continue to suppose that each CCP’s belief about true price
impact is given by a symmetric, positive definite matrix Gi ∈ Rm×m, where m is the total number
of securities available for clearing.
We assume that a CCP clears all linear combinations of the securities it clears, and does not
clear linear combinations that include securities that it does not clear. So, the choice of a subset
of security types is a choice of subspace of Rm. Write m = m1 +m2 +m3, where5
m1 = number of security types cleared only by CCP 1,
m2 = number of security types cleared by both CCPs,
m3 = number of security types cleared only by CCP 2.
We also assume that the security types are numbered in this order, so that the first m1 types are
cleared only by CCP 1, and so on.
The margin matrices F1 and F2 have dimensions (m1 + m2) × (m1 + m2) and (m2 + m3) ×
(m2 +m3), respectively. Denote by P1 ∈ R(m1+m2)×m the matrix of the projection of Rm onto the
first m1 + m2 coordinates corresponding to swap types cleared by CCP 1. Similarly, denote by
P2 ∈ R(m2+m3)×m the matrix of the projection onto the last m2 + m3 coordinates corresponding
to swap types cleared by CCP 2. Finally, let the notation 0k ∈ Rk denote a zero row vector of
length k, and the notation (x>1 ,0m3) and (0m1 , x>2 ) denote the lifting of vectors x1 ∈ Rm1+m2 and
x2 ∈ Rm2+m3 from the subspaces cleared by the two CCPs to full-length portfolio vectors.
With the above notation in place, we can make the following definition:
5Without loss of generality, securities cleared by neither CCP can be excluded from consideration.
37
CHAPTER 2. HIDDEN ILLIQUIDITY WITH MULTIPLE CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES
Definition 3 (Partitioned Equilibrium with Linear Price Impact). Given price impact belief matrices
G1, G2 ∈ Rm for the two CCPs, a partitioned equilibrium is defined by
1. a partition (m1,m2,m3) of the m swap types,
2. allocation functions x1 : Rm → Rm1+m2 and x2 : Rm → Rm2+m3,
3. price impact margin matrices F1 ∈ Rm1+m2, F2 ∈ Rm2+m3,









x>1 F1x1 + x>2 F2x2
∣∣∣ subject to (x>1 ,0m3) + (0m1 , x>2 ) = x} , (2.12)
2. each CCP i collects liquidity margin based on its true price impact beliefs, i.e.,
x1(x)>F1x1(x) = x1(x)>P1G1x, x2(x)>F2x2(x) = x2(x)>P2G2x. (2.13)
The following theorem characterizes partitioned equilibria:
Theorem 2. A necessary and sufficient condition for a partitioned equilibrium with linear price






 , i ∈ {1, 2}, (2.14)
with Gi(1, 1) ∈ Rm1×m1, Gi(2, 2) ∈ Rm2×m2 ,Gi(3, 3) ∈ Rm3×m3, where the submatrices satisfy
G1(2, 2) = G2(2, 2) , G(2, 2). (2.15)
In this case, CCP 1 clears the first m1 + m2 swap types, CCP 2 clears the last m2 + m3 swap
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for any symmetric, positive definite matrices F1(2, 2), F2(2, 2) ∈ Rm2×m2 satisfying
F1(2, 2)−1 + F2(2, 2)−1 = G(2, 2)−1. (2.17)
Theorem 2 establishes a number of requirements for partitioned equilibria. Condition (2.15)
implies that the two CCPs need to have common beliefs on price impact for the instruments they
both clear. The block structure requirement in (2.14) implies that an instruments cleared by only
a single CCP cannot have any cross-price impact with any swap clear by the other CCP.
Next, we consider a refinement of the partitioned equilibrium of Definition 3:
Definition 4 (Stable Equilibrium). A partitioned equilibrium (m1,m2,m3, F1, F2, x1, x2) is called sta-
ble if it is undominated in the sense that there exists no other equilibrium (m˜1, m˜2, m˜3, F˜1, F˜2, x˜1, x˜2)
such that
x1(x)>F1x1(x) + x2(x)>F2x2(x) ≥ x˜1(x)>F˜1x˜1(x) + x˜2(x)>F˜2x˜2(x), for all x ∈ Rm,
and that the inequality holds strictly for some x ∈ Rm.
An equilibrium with the block structure (2.14)–(2.15) may fail to be stable in the following
way: Suppose that among the first m1 instruments (those cleared only by CCP 1) there is some
instrument with index j for which G2(j, j) < G1(j, j), and suppose that G1(j, k) = G2(j, k) = 0,
for all k 6= j. Then we can construct another equilibrium by moving instrument j from the set
cleared only by CCP 1 to the set cleared only by CCP 2 and reduce the total margin charged.
The following result provides a sufficient condition for stability:
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Proposition 3 (Stable Partitioned Equilibrium). A partitioned equilibrium is stable if
G1(1, 1)  G2(1, 1), G1(3, 3)  G2(3, 3), (2.18)
in the positive definite order.
Proposition 3 states that an equilibrium is stable if each CCP collects less margin for the set of
instruments it clears exclusively than the other CCP would. For example, if G1  G2, then having
CCP 2 clear all positions alone is the unique stable equilibrium.
2.6. Adding Uncertainty
To this point, we have assumed a completely deterministic model in which each CCP is able to
infer a clearing member’s full portfolio vector x from the portion cleared by that CCP by effectively
inverting the solution to the clearing member’s problem (2.5). In this section, we extend our results
by adding uncertainty. We consider two forms of uncertainty: uncertainty in the CCPs’ inferences
about the clearing member’s portfolio, and uncertainty in the CCPs’ beliefs about the true price
impact.
To incorporate uncertainty in the CCPs’ beliefs, we take the price impact matrices G1 and G2
to be stochastic. We assume that these matrices are almost surely symmetric and positive definite.
The same is then true of their expectations E[Gi], i ∈ {1, 2}.
We use a simple model of the CCP’s uncertainty about the clearing member’s portfolio. We
suppose that when CCP i clears a portion xi of the full portfolio x, it forms an estimate
xˆi = x+ i,
of the full portfolio, with E[i] = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}. In other words, a CCP cannot perfectly infer the
clearing member’s full portfolio, but it can form an unbiased estimate xˆi of the full portfolio.
This model provides a reduced-form description of the many sources of uncertainty that would in
practice prevent a CCP from reverse engineering a clearing member’s portfolio. In particular, a CCP
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may not have perfect information about its competitors’ margin functions, and considerations other
than margin minimization may influence the clearing member’s allocation. Our key assumption
is that these factors do not lead the CCP to systematically misjudge the clearing member’s full
portfolio. A more complete model would generate the i endogenously from a more fundamental
description of uncertainty. In the absence of such an extension, we proceed with the reduced-form
model, recognizing its limitations.
To extend our earlier results to include uncertainty, we suppose that each CCP sets its margin
function to collect sufficient margin in expectation. More precisely, we define an equilibrium as in









, i ∈ {1, 2}. (2.19)
Proposition 4. Suppose that for each CCP i, i and Gi are uncorrelated. Then a necessary and
sufficient condition for equilibrium with linear price impact is that the two CCPs have common
views on the mean market impact, i.e., that E[G1] = E[G2] , G.
In this case, all equilibria are determined by the symmetric, positive definite solutions F1, F2 ∈
Rm×m to the equation
G−1 = F−11 + F−12 .









= x>i E[Gi](x+ E[i]) = x>i E[Gi]x.




= x>i Gx. The result now follows from Theorem 1. 
2.7. A Single Instrument with General Price Impact
In general, it is not easy to solve for equilibrium under nonlinear price impact models. It is,
however, possible to characterize the scalar case. In this section, we specialize to the case of a
single instrument (m = 1) in which the portfolio x ∈ R is scalar. Each CCP i has price impact
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belief Gi(x) and margin function fi(x) = xFi(x).
Suppose that (F1, F2, x1, x2) form an equilibrium according to Definition 2. Then, first order
necessary and sufficient conditions for the clearing member’s problem (2.5) are that
F1(x1) + x1F ′1(x1) = F2(x2) + x2F ′2(x2). (2.20)
Also, the sufficient margin condition is equivalent to
Fi(xi) = Gi(x). (2.21)




to denote the convex conjugate of a function of f on R.
Theorem 3. (i) If the CCPs have common beliefs G1 = G2 , G, then an equilibrium exists. All
equilibria result in proportional allocations x1 = αx and x2 = (1 − α)x, for some α ∈ (0, 1),
and
F1(x) = G(x/α), F2(x) = G(x/(1− α)).
(ii) If an equilibrium with proportional allocations exists, then the CCPs have common beliefs
G1 = G2.
(iii) In any equilibrium with common beliefs, feff(x) = g(x) , xG(x), meaning that the effective
margin equals the shared view on the required margin. Moreover, the common belief can be
recovered from the individual margin functions through the relation
g = (f∗1 + f∗2 )∗. (2.22)
Proof. Proof (i) For the existence of an equilibrium, it suffices to show that
x1 = x2 = x/2, F1(x) = F2(x) = G(2x),
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is an equilibrium. This follows from the fact that (2.20) and (2.21) hold in this case.
Next, we establish that all equilibria result in proportional allocations. If G1 = G2 , G, (2.21)
implies F1(x1) = F2(x2), so (2.20) implies
x1F
′
1(x1) = x2F ′2(x2). (2.23)
Differentiating (2.21) with respect to x, we get that
F ′i (xi)x′i = G′i(x).
This yields
F ′1(x1)x′1 = F ′2(x2)x′2. (2.24)
This implies that x1 and x2 are strictly increasing and therefore strictly positive for x > 0. For








So x2 = cx1 for some constant c > 0, and the claim holds with α , 1/(1 + c).
(ii)Suppose x1 = αx and x2 = (1− α)x, and define
h(x) , F1(x1)− F2(x2) = F1(αx)− F2((1− α)x).
Differentiating this with respect to x, we have
h′(x) = αF1(αx)− (1− α)F ′2((1− α)x).
But using the first-order condition (2.20), we can write h as
h(x) = −x1F ′1(x1) + x2F ′2(x2) = −αxF1(αx) + (1− α)xF ′2((1− α)x) = −xh′(x).
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Then, h(x) + xh′(x) = 0, which means that xh(x) is a constant, so we must have h(x) ≡ 0. In
other words, F1(x1) = F2(x2), and thus G1 = G2 by (2.21).
(iii) We take the conjugate of the effective margin feff in (2.5). Because fi is convex and
continuous, we have, by Rockafellar (1997, Theorem 16.4),
f∗eff = (f12f2)∗ = f∗1 + f∗2 .
The infimal convolution of convex, continuous functions is also convex and continuous so
feff = f∗∗eff = (f∗1 + f∗2 )∗,
using Theorem 12.2 and Corollary 12.2.1 of Rockafellar (1997). Now, notice that in equilibrium we
always have
f1(x1) + f2(x2) = x1F1(x1) + x2F2(x2) = x1G1(x) + x2G2(x) = xG(x).
Then by the definition of infimal convolution, we have g(x) = xG(x) = feff(x). 
In the case of linear price impact, the total margin functions f1, f2 are quadratic, and (2.22)
leads to
g∗(x) = G−1x2 = f∗eff(x) = F−11 x2 + F−12 x2,
for all x ∈ R, so that
G−1 = F−11 + F−12 . (2.25)
This is just the scalar case of Theorem 1.
As another example, suppose the price impact function takes the form G(x) , cxβ, given an





2 = c−1/β. (2.26)
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To see this, first notice that g(x) = cxβ+1, hence
g∗(y) = c−1/β x
1+1/β(β + 1)−1/β
1 + 1/β .
Similarly,




1 + 1/β .
Then (2.26) is just a result of applying (2.22). Note that (2.25) is a special case of (2.26) with
β = 1.
Theorem 3 leaves open the possibility of an equilibrium in which the CCPs have different views,
which would require that the allocations x1, x2 not be proportional.
2.8. Implications and Concluding Remarks
Our analysis has relied on simplifying assumptions and a stylized model of the complex decisions
faced by central counterparties and their clearing members. Nevertheless, this analysis has practical
implications for the functioning of derivatives markets.
◦ A CCP’s initial margin requirements should reflect liquidity costs as well as market risk.
Liquidity costs increase more than proportionally with position size, so margin requirements
should as well. This is a premise of our analysis but it bears repeating. In responding to
comments on its proposed rules, the CFTC specifically declined recommendations requiring
that position concentration be factored into margin calculations, leaving the matter to the
discretion of each CCP; (see Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2011, p. 69366).
◦ In incorporating liquidity costs into margin requirements, a CCP also needs to consider a
clearing member’s positions at other CCPs. If the clearing member defaults, its positions at
all CCPs will hit the market simultaneously, so price impact is determined by the clearing
member’s combined positions, not its position at a single CCP. Moreover, superlinear margin
charges designed to capture liquidity costs create an incentive for clearing members to split
positions across CCPs, thus amplifying the effect of hidden illiquidity.
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◦ To counteract this effect, CCPs and clearing members need to share information about posi-
tions across CCPs. If this proves infeasible, given the sensitivity of the information, an alter-
native approach would be for each CCP to make a conservative assumption about a clearing
member’s positions at other CCPs (with a correspondingly conservative margin charge) and
create a positive incentive for clearing members to provide this information by offering a
potential margin reduction in exchange. A CCP could make a conservative assumption by
comparing the positions in a contract it clears with the total outstanding positions in that
contract across all participants and CCPs. This type of aggregate data is collected by swap
data repositories, as mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act.
◦ Our analysis also points to the need for CCPs to share information about liquidation costs.
The relevant costs would be incurred at the failure of a major swaps dealer and are not easily
gleaned from historical data. To better estimate price impacts, CCPs could require their
clearing members to regularly provide prices and quantities at which they are committed to
buy or sell upon the default of another member.
◦ A CCP is required to test its default management process, through which a defaulting mem-
ber’s positions are unwound, at least annually. These default management drills should ex-
plicitly account for the actions of other CCPs directly affected by the same member’s default.
◦ Market participants and regulators have recently called for standardized stress tests for CCPs.
Our analysis points to the need for each CCP’s stress scenarios to include the actions of other
CCPs. This would be in contrast to the current regulatory stress tests for banks, which treat
each bank in isolation.
These recommendations are not necessarily easy to implement. Each of these steps requires further
research.
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Chapter 3
Portfolio Liquidity Estimation and
Optimal Execution
3.1. Introduction
In portfolio management, liquidity is important since the value of a portfolio depends on its ability
to convert into cash, especially in a time of distress. Liquidity is even more important for active
investors and asset managers who need to unwind significant positions on a frequent basis in order
to profit from trading on dynamic predictions of asset returns, as such trading activities could incur
huge liquidity costs, especially when the position is large.
We believe that liquidity should be measured at the portfolio level across multiple assets si-
multaneously, instead of the level of single assets. The reasons are two folds. First of all, many
portfolio transitions include trading more than one asset. The simplest example would be the open
end funds, whenever they get an inflow or outflow, they have to in effect trade portfolios if they
want to maintain proportional holdings. Second, asset prices are often correlated. If you measure
liquidity at the level of single assets, you are essentially ignoring the this inter-correlation among
assets together with the potential savings by trading correlated assets. Even if you are only trading
a single asset, to the extent that optimal execution is about the trade-off of risk versus actual
returns, you can potentially do it significantly more cheaply if you are allowed to trade other assets
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in a portfolio approach.
Yet there has been a wide disconnect from these intuitions and the practice of liquidation, which
still relies primarily on the single-asset optimal execution framework. On reason for this disconnect
is that in practice the decision and execution of portfolio liquidation are often separate. Given
the challenging task of correctly estimating liquidity costs, executions are often conducted by a
specialized team or outsourced to a third party. As a result, the decision of liquidation is made by
the portfolio management branch, while the execution are done by a trader or an algorithmic trading
system which typically do not have the authority to hedge the liquidation process by establishing
new positions.
In this chapter, we propose a tractable multi-dimensional generalization of the Amgren-Chriss
model. Our model is built on previous work that allow trading correlated assets such as Kim (2014).
However, beyond these work, we incorporate the trading of liquid bundles such as ETFs. Our work
provides analysis on the underline drivers of the liquidity costs. We specialize our results to the
factor model where correlations of returns are driven by common factors. We show the liquidity
cost is primarily driven by idiosyncratic risk in the large universe asymptotic regime. Here, large
universe refers to the case where there are many assets relative to the number of common underlying
factors (see detailed discussion in Section 3.4. This is consistent with the setup of the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory first developed by Ross (1976). The intuition is that the market risk of the portfolio
can be hedged with little costs given the availability of a huge number of assets. Another key
question is how the inclusion of standardized liquid bundles affect the optimal liquidity cost in the
“large universe” asymptotic regime. By considering a degenerate problem where we only want to
liquidate one asset, we show that the benefit of hedging with liquid bundles is essentially equivalent
to increasing the liquidity of the individual asset. For the non-asymptotic cases, we manage to
provide a good approximation of liquidity cost by exploiting the structural properties we find. In
addition, we obtained a bound on the difference between this approximation and exact solutions,
and related to the bound to the structural properties of the covariance matrix of asset prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present our model and char-
acterize the solution of the resulting optimal execution problem. In Section 3.3, we specialize our
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results to settings with separable transaction costs that are of particular interest. In Section 3.4,
we introduce the large-universe asymptotic regime and establish our main structural results. In
Section 3.5, we provide empirical examples calibrated to market data. Section 3.6 concludes. The
proofs are provided in the appendix.
3.2. Model
In this section, we describe our general model setup and characterize the solution of the resulting
optimization problem.
3.2.1. Setup
Portfolio and trading strategies. Consider an agent who wishes to liquidate efficiently a portfolio
consisting of positions in up to n assets. The agent’s initial holdings are specified by the vector
q ∈ Rn, where component qi represents the initial position in asset i denominated in shares. In
order to liquidate this portfolio, the agent can trade m ≥ n possible liquid instruments. The vector
yi ∈ Rn specifies the composition of the ith instrument in terms of shares of underlying assets.
That is, selling one unit of the ith instrument results in the agent’s portfolio components being
adjusted according the the vector yi. Denote by Y , [y1, y2, ..., ym] ∈ Rn×m the liquidation matrix
that characterizes the available instruments.
In the simplest case, the agent is only allowed to directly trade the underlying assets. Then, the
tradeable instruments correspond to the underlying assets (n = m) and Y = I; i.e., the liquidity
matrix is the identity matrix. More generally, our model supports tradeable instruments that are
not necessarily individual assets, but can be liquid bundles that are essentially portfolios that can be
traded directly. As was discussed in Section 1.2, examples of such liquid bundles include exchange
traded funds1 (ETFs), credit default swap (CDS) indices, and tradeable futures spreads. As an
example, consider the following:
1Strictly speaking, an ETF may not be not exactly equivalent or fungable to its underlying portfolio, but we will
assume the existence of efficient creation or redemption mechanisms that make them equivalent for our modeling
purposes.
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Example 1 (Two-asset ETF). Suppose an agent starts with a portfolio consisting of two stocks,
and can trade those stocks directly. In addition, suppose that there exists an ETF of a portfolio
consisting of one share of each stock. In this case, the liquidation matrix is given by
Y =
 1 0 1
0 1 1
 .
We will make the assumption that rank(Y ) = n, i.e., that Y is full rank, so that any initial
portfolio in q ∈ Rn can be liquidated with the instruments available.
Given a liquidation matrix Y , a trading strategy is characterized by the rate at which each of
the liquid instruments (the columns of Y ) are bought or sold. Specifically, a trading strategy is
defined by the control process u ∈ L1([0,∞);Rm), where ui(t) represents the rate at (in shares per
unit time) at which instrument i is traded at time t. We adopt the convention that positive trading
rates correspond to selling, while negative trading rates correspond to buying. Given the control
u and the initial position q, the evolution of position over time is given by the position process
x ∈ C([0,∞);Rn), where
x(0) = q, x˙(t) = −Y u(t), ∀ t ≥ 0.
Equivalently,
x(t) = q −
∫ t
0
Y u(s) ds, ∀ t ≥ 0.
Trading constraints. We consider a constrained liquidity setting where the trading rate of each
instrument is bounded according to
|ui(t)| ≤ γi, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m, t ≥ 0. (3.1)
Here γi > 0 is a bound on on the absolute trading rate of instrument i. Such restrictions on the
trading rate are very common in practice, for several reasons. First, an excessive trading rate will
almost certainly lead to unfavorable execution prices due to market impact. We will momentarily
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introduce transaction costs that depend on the trading rate. However, at very high trading rates, the
agent will create a significant supply-demand imbalance in the market, and hence transaction costs
will be dominated by effects such as information leakage and are difficult to estimate. Empirical
evidence on information leakage of large trades is found by Van Kervel and Menkveld (2015) where
the authors show that the high frequency traders “prey” on orders that are large. On the other
hand, transaction costs for very low trading rates will be dominated by observable quantities such
as the bid-ask spread and easy to estimate. Hence, transaction cost models typically are accurate
only for a restricted range of trading rates, and the constraint (3.1) can enforce this range. Finally,
observe that constraints of the form (3.1) are very common in practice, and can be easily calibrated
through market parameters. Typically, one might restrict the trading rate to a certain percentage
of the future predicted overall market trading volume for a particular instrument.
Transaction costs. We allow for the possibility of trades to be associated with transaction costs.
Such costs may arise from, say, commissions or trading fees, the bid-ask spread, or the distortion
of market prices caused by the agent’s trading. In all of these cases, transaction costs are related
to the trading rate. For example, costs associated per share commissions or the bid-ask spread
accumulate as a linear function of the trading rate. Market impact may take a more complicated
form, but will still be an increasing function of the trading rate.
Though the sources of transaction costs vary, they are all closely related to the trading rate. In
particular, if we look at the rate of transaction cost accumulation, the contributions of commission
fees and the costs from bid-ask spreads are linear as a function of the trading rate, whereas market
impact costs may take a more complicated form such as that studied in Kyle and Obizhaeva
(2016b). Here, we will not seek to decompose the transaction costs and will describe the total rate
of transaction cost accumulation with some functional f(·) of the trading rate u. We assume that
f : Rn → R+ is a non-negative convex function that is symmetric around 0, i.e., f(u) = f(−u),
for all u ∈ Rn. Further, we assume that no costs are incurred by not trading, i.e., f(0) = 0. By
making these assumptions, we are essentially focusing on only the temporary (or instantaneous)
market impact, which depends only on how fast you trade. We are not considering permanent or
transient market impact, which features the impact of current trade on future execution prices.
51
CHAPTER 3. PORTFOLIO LIQUIDITY ESTIMATION AND OPTIMAL EXECUTION
Price dynamics. The evolution of the price dynamics is typically determined by a predictable
drift component and a random noise component. Since the liquidation process typically happens
in a short time horizon, we will neglect the drift and focus only on the unpredictable variations.
Specifically, we assume that the prices of the n assets (S(t) ∈ Rn) follow a multidimensional




where W (t) ∈ Rn is an n-dimensional standard Brownian motion, and Σ ∈ Rn×n is a symmetric
positive definite matrix that characterizes the covariance structure of W (t). We will also assume
that there are no tracking errors for the liquid bundles. As a result, the price process of any
instrument yi is given by y>i S(t). We will also make the assumption that the covariance matrix Σ
is constant over the period of liquidation. This may be a reasonable approximation of since the
liquidation process we are considering typically takes a short time horizon ranging from hours to
days. It is expected that the covariance structure will not change dramatically over such a short
time horizon.
Portfolio value and risk. We now discuss the profit and loss resulting from the liquidation process.
For any liquidation process defined by (x, u), let ISt be the implementation shortfall from liquidating
the portfolio up to time t. This is defined to be the difference between the value of the initial
portfolio at time 0 and the value of the remaining portfolio at time t (along with any intermediate
















The first term represents the total effect of price changes during the liquidation process up to time
t. The second term is the loss due to transaction costs.
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Notice that, by construction x ∈ C([0,∞);Rn). It follows immediately that
∫ t
0
x(s)>x(s) ds <∞. (3.5)














The mean of IS is simply the total transaction costs associated with the liquidation process. The
variance of IS provides us with a natural measure of market risk during the liquidation process.
Optimization problem. The optimal liquidation problem can be formulated by minimizing the









subject to x˙(t) = −Y u(t), ∀ t ≥ 0,




Here, µ > 0 is a parameter capturing the degree of the agent’s risk aversion.
The objective value of this dynamic control problem captures an explicit trade-off between
transaction costs and market risk. If the agent trades faster, he is more likely to end up with higher
transaction costs due to increased market impact; if he trades slower, he will end up facing more
market risk over a longer period of time. As we will show in Theorem 4, the optimal liquidation
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process always has the finite objective value defined in (3.8). This implies that the asymptotic
position is zero as time goes to infinity; otherwise the risk component of the objective value in (3.8)
would be infinite. An alternative would be to explicitly impose a exogenous finite time horizon
by which the entire position must be liquidated, and this might be more appropriate in a fire sale
setting, for example. Many of the results in this paper would hold in such an alternative, but we
will opt for the simplicitly of an endogenous time horizon.
Note that explicit in the formulation (3.8) is the fact that we are restricting attention to only
deterministic strategies; in other words, we are requiring that trading rates for each asset at every
time to be specified in advance at time t = 0. In general, there may be adaptive or stochastic
strategies that perform better for our mean-variance objective. For example, Almgren and Lorenz
(2007) show that stochastic strategies may outperform the best deterministic strategy; see also
Lorenz and Almgren (2011). However, the proper economic motivation for mean-variance objective
comes from the problem of maximizing expected utility for exponential, or CARA, utility functions.
Schied et al. (2010) found that there is no added utility from adaptive strategies for CARA investors
with a finite time horizon. Schöneborn (2011) expands this observation to infinite time horizons.
As a result, if we believe the mean-variance objective stems from the optimization of CARA utility
functions, the deterministic strategy is optimal. In any case, we will restrict our attention to
deterministic strategies. This is consistent with much of the rest of the mean-variance optimal
execution literature.
3.2.2. Optimal Strategy
In this section, we discuss some of the general characteristics of optimal strategies in our formulation.
Theorem 4 (Existence and Convexity). The dynamic control problem defined in (3.8) is bounded and
an optimal solution u∗ always exists. In addition, the optimal value (the liquidity cost) is convex
in initial position.
The proof of the theorem is given in the Appendix and is similar to results of Guéant (2015);
Guéant et al. (2015). In our setting, the main technical requirement for existence of an optimal so-
lution is the constrained liquidity assumption (3.1). This helps us to establish the equi-integrability
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of the feasible set. Because of this, our result is in some ways simpler than the earlier work. For
example, we do not need to impose additional requirements on the transaction cost functional f(·)
beyond the convexity. Note that one implication of the existence theorem is that the optimal ob-
jective value is finite. This implies that, as t → ∞, x(t) → 0. In other words, the position will be
asympototically liquidated.
A key element in our framework is that we allow for the direct trading of liquid bundles. As
such, we may have more instruments than individual assets (m > n), and it is possible to have more
than one trading strategy u(·) corresponding to any given trajectory of position x(·). Therefore,
the uniqueness of the optimal trading strategy may not be guaranteed. However, the optimal
trajectory of position x(·) must be unique, i.e., all optimal solutions have the same position at any
time. Moreover, as established in the following theorem, under an additional convexity assumption
the trading strategy must also be unique:
Theorem 5 (Uniqueness). All optimal solutions for the the dynamic control problem in (3.8) have a
unique optimal position trajectory x∗ ∈ C([0,∞);Rn). Moreover, if the transaction cost functional
f()¸dot) is strictly convex, the optimal trading strategy u∗ ∈ L1([0,∞;Rm) must also be unique.
In general, it is difficult to come up with closed-form solutions to the dynamic control problem
given in (3.8) (although we will consider some special cases in Section 3.3). We provide sufficient
conditions for optimality by exploiting the convexity of the problem in the following:
Theorem 6 (Sufficiency). The pair (x∗, u∗) ∈ C([0,∞);Rn)×L1([0,∞);Rm) form an optimal solu-
tion of (3.8) if, for all t ≥ 0,









x∗(s)>ΣY u ds. (3.9)
Theorem 6 provides a sufficient condition for the optimal trading strategy. Intuitively, the
optimal trading rate at any given time results from a trade-off between the two components in
(3.9). The first component represents the instantaneous transaction cost and the second component
represents the impact on future risks. Note that Theorem 6 gives a sufficient condition, but not
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a necessary one. If, however, the liquidation process takes only finite time, it can be shown that,
(3.9) is also necessary, using Pontryagin’s minimum principle, as we will do later. The necessity
is difficult to generalize to an infinite trading horizon, where the corresponding general version of
Pontryagin’s minimum principle is often pathological (Halkin, 1974).
3.3. Examples: Separable Transaction Costs
In the optimization problem (3.8), decision making across multiple assets is coupled. This comes
from two fronts: the correlation between asset prices and possible cross-asset market impact in the
transaction cost functional. However, it is extremely difficult to measure cross-asset market impact
if any exists. Although our general framework in (3.8) allows for the existence of cross-asset market
impact, we will assume otherwise in order to maintain the focus on the correlation of assets and on
the trade-off between market risk and transaction cost.
Specifically, the class of transaction cost functionals that are of particular interest are what we





for u ∈ Rn, where fˆ : R→ R+ is a nonnegative convex function symmetric around 0 with f(0) = 0.
The scaling constant νj > 0 captures the magnitude of the transaction cost of asset j, as long as
γj is the maximum trading rate from (3.1).
The intuition behind this type of functional is that the transaction cost of each asset is driven by
similar mechanisms and depends primarily on the relative trading rate (uj/γj). This corresponds
to the fact that assets with higher liquidity (higher γj) are expected to have a smaller transaction
cost given the same trading rate. Additionally, (3.10) rules out the possibility of cross-asset market
impact. Though advocated by some approaches in the literature such as Tsoukalas et al. (2014),
cross-asset market impact is extremely difficult to estimate. On the other hand, the transaction
costs of the form in (3.10) can be estimated relatively easily from historical transaction data.
In what follows, we focus specifically on two examples of separable transaction costs: zero-cost
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constrained liquidity and linear-cost constrained liquidity.
3.3.1. Zero-Cost Constrained Liquidity
The simplest case of a separable transaction cost is where there is a constraint on the trading rate,
but trading itself doesn’t incur any cost. In this case we simply assume that f(u) = 0. Thus, we
are capturing a setting where trading costs are minimal relative to risk, e.g., when the agent is very
patient and tends to trade slowly and passively. A potential trading strategy is for the agent to
trade only passively with mid-point orders where the cost from bid-ask spread is eliminated.






subject to x˙(t) = −Y u(t), ∀ t ≥ 0,




Here we assume that the parameter for risk aversion (µ) takes the value of µ = 1 without loss of
generality. This setup under zero-cost constrained liquidity is very similar to that in Kim (2014).
The main difference is that we allow for the trading of liquid bundles and hence Y does not need
to be an identity matrix.
The zero-cost constrained liquidity model has some interesting features. The first is that the
problem is scalable in terms of initial position.
Theorem 7 (Scaling). If u∗ is optimal for the problem starting from q, then u˜(t) = u∗(t/α) (∀t > 0)
is optimal for the problem starting with αq with ∀α ∈ R+, where
J∗(αq) = α3J∗(q).
Interestingly, the optimal object value, which is essentially the variance of the liquidation P&L,
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scales with initial position to the power of three. This is consistent with the prediction of inventory
risk model (see Chapter 16 in Grinold and Kahn (2000)) that the total trading cost increases to
the 3/2 power of the amount traded. First of all, the estimated time before a sufficient number of
opposing trades appear to clear out the agent’s inventory is thought to be linear with the position
size. The time to clear implies a per-share inventory risk proportional to the square root of the
liquidation time (essentially the square root of the initial position). Then, by assuming that the
market impact is proportional to the inventory risk, the total cost scales with the 3/2 power of the
initial position.
Another interesting property of the zero-cost constrained liquidity model is that the optimal
liquidation process requires only finite time. Although we do expect the position to be liquidated
eventually, in theory our framework does not guarantee the finiteness of liquidation time. It could
be that as the position gets smaller, the transaction cost bypasses the market risk, in which case
it makes sense to trade slower and slower to keep the transaction cost small. One example is
the case where the transaction cost is quadratic and (3.8) becomes a constrained linear-quadratic
control problem, which takes infinite time. However, under zero-cost constrained liquidity, where
the finiteness of the liquidation time is guaranteed, the theorem goes as follows.
Theorem 8 (Finite Horizon). For any initial position q, the optimal position trajectory x(t) is guar-
anteed to reach zero in finite time.
Remember that in general the necessary condition of (3.8) is hard to derive. But, given that
the optimal liquidation process takes only finite time, Pontryagin’s minimum principle can be used
to derive the necessity of (3.9).
Lemma 1 (Optimality). A feasible control u∗ is optimal for (3.11) if and only if







where x∗ is uniquely determined by u∗ and q through the control function.
The condition (3.12) suggests what people called a “bang-bang” control or singular control,
where uj(t) takes the upper bound γj if the jth component of
∫∞
t (x∗(s))>ΣY ds is positive and
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takes the lower bound −γj if it is/they are negative. Properties of singular control problems can
be found in Johnson and Gibson (1963), among many other works.
In general, it is difficult to come up with a closed-form solution to our problem in high dimen-
sions. However, it is possible to characterize the two-dimensional case. Although it is possible to
provide closed-form solutions to all two-dimensional cases, we are particularly interested in what
we call high liquidity hedging, where the liquidity of the hedging asset is high. In practice, it is
perhaps the most interesting setting, as people tend not to hedge with highly illiquid assets. The
following theorem characterizes this setting.
























Condition (3.13) is what we call the “high liquidity hedging condition”. It requires that the






The right-hand side is what we call the optimal hedging ratio. Given a unit of asset 1, it can be
shown that the optimal amount of asset 2 needed to minimize total risk is given by |ρ|σ1/σ2. By
examining the proof, one finds that the optimal trading strategy is to trade asset 2 as a hedge
before unloading the hedged portfolio. And |ρ|σ1/σ2 is the optimal quantity of asset 2 needed to
hedge every unit of asset 1. Equation (3.14) suggests some very intuitive structural properties of
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liquidity costs. The first term (13
q3
γ1
σ21) is the fair liquidity cost of trading asset 1 alone without
hedging. The second term can then be interpreted as the benefit from hedging. Given that (3.13)
holds, it is easy to see that the hedging benefit is increasing in |ρ|, which captures the correlation
between the two assets. This indicates that hedging is more efficient when one use highly correlated
assets. Additionally, the hedging benefit is increasing in γ2σ2, a fact that can be interpreted as the
rate of risk transferred by trading the hedging asset.
3.3.2. Linear-Cost Constrained Liquidity




νj |uj |. (3.15)
Notice that this definition is still consistent with (3.10) if we have
fˆ(u) = |u|
and if we define vj as the coefficient. Now νj can be viewed as the bid-ask spread of asset j.









subject to x˙(t) = −Y u(t), ∀ t ≥ 0,




The scaling property ceases to hold in this case as the transaction costs are typically linear in
the position traded, whereas the risk component is at least quadratic. Again, a general closed-
form solution is beyond our reach, but we can still explicitly solve the one-dimensional and two-
dimensional cases.
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Suppose we need to liquidate a certain position in asset 1. In the one-dimensional case where
hedging is not possible, the total transaction costs incurred for trading a certain position are fixed
and do not depend on the trading rate. As a result, the optimal strategy is to sell the position as
fast as possible (at rate γ). Hence we get the following proposition:
Theorem 10 (One Asset). In the one-dimensional case, the cost of liquidating a position of q with
parameters (σ, γ, ν) is given by
J∗(q) = ν|q|+ µ |q|
3σ2
3γ .
The first term represents the total transaction costs associated with liquidating a position of q,
and the second term represents the market risk of this liquidating process.
The two-dimensional case is more complicated – yet tractable. We consider only the case of
“high liquidity hedging,” where (3.13) holds.




 , Y =
 1 0
0 1
 , q = (q, 0)>,




























3(1 + |ρ|σ1γ1σ2γ2 )
. (3.18)
In this case, hedging with other assets comes with transaction costs, which are proportional
to the hedging position acquired. Intuitively, if the transaction costs strictly dominate the market
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risk, the agent will find hedging unattractive. Theorem 11 indicates that hedging is only optimal
when the position passes the threshold defined in (3.17). This provides intuition about the trade-off
between hedging benefits and their associated transaction costs. Specifically, hedging is less likely
to be beneficial when:
1. The position size is small.
2. The covariance between the two assets is small.
3. The transaction costs for the hedging asset (asset 2 in this case) are large.
4. The agent is not risk averse (i.e., there are smaller µ).
Additionally, the structure of (3.18) is interesting. We can see that the first term of (3.18)
is exactly the liquidity cost given in (3.14) in Theorem 9, which is the liquidity cost for the case
of a zero transaction cost. The second and third terms are the transaction costs associated with
the trading strategy given in Theorem 9. The last term is the penalty that results from the fact
that we expect less hedging in the presence of transaction costs. Interestingly, the penalty term
is some constant that does not depend on the liquidating position. Thus, if the position is too
small, hedging is not worthwhile; otherwise the optimal liquidity cost is the cost associated with
the optimal strategy in the zero transaction cost case minus a constant that does not depend on
position size.
3.4. Large Universe
Although deriving a closed-form solution for (3.8) proves to be difficult, it is not hard to see that the
optimal liquidity cost is determined primarily by two factors: the covariance structure of prices and
transaction cost functionals. We have discussed several transaction cost models in Section 3.3; now
we consider the covariance structure of prices. Throughout this section, we will assume separable
transaction costs.
In the most straightforward case where all asset prices are independent of each other, the
liquidation problem of a portfolio consisting of n assets will degenerate to n one-dimensional sub-
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problems where each asset is liquidated on its own. But if the asset prices are correlated, the story
is more complicated. First of all, decisions regarding the liquidation of assets across a portfolio are
coupled. Second, it might be beneficial to hedge a position’s market risk by acquiring some assets
that are negatively correlated with the liquidating portfolio, as long as the extra transaction costs
are acceptable. However, since the complexity of covariance structure grows with asset numbers,
it becomes extremely difficult to provide an intuitive analysis of the liquidity costs. Unless we can
somehow decrease the dimensions of the problem, very little can be said. By the same logic, the
widely accepted idea that the variations of the prices of a large number of assets can be modeled
by a small number of systemic factors becomes appealing.
Various models have been developed in finance to model the structure of the covariance matrix
of asset prices. Here, we consider the multi-factor risk model first developed by Ross (1976) and
then generalized by Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983). The multi-factor risk is the basis for
the arbitrage pricing theory which is well-studied in the finance literature. The main idea is that
covariance across asset prices can be decomposed into two components: a systemic one and an
idiosyncratic one. The systemic component is then modeled through various systemic factors that
characterize different sources of systemic risks. This type of model has been widely used in the
industry to predict risk structure in the solution of practical investment problems, e.g., the BARRA
model from MSCI.
We define F (t) ∈ RK to be the K-dimensional factor process. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the factors are orthonormal and follow a standard K-dimensional Brownian motion.
If the factors are correlated, we can always find a new set of K orthonormal factors with a change
of coordinate, as long as the covariance matrix of factors is full rank. Under a continuous time
version of the multiple-factor model, the price dynamics of asset i can be written as
dSi(t) = l>i dF (t) + ςidzi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, t ≥ 0, (3.19)
where zi(t) is a standard Brownian motion representing the idiosyncratic shocks for asset i. lj ∈ RK
is the loading vector for asset j. ςi is the magnitude of the asset’s idiosyncratic risk and hence
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ςizi(t) represents the idiosyncratic disturbances that are zero-mean and independent across assets.
In addition, we assume that zi(t) is independent of the factors.
Usually, the number of assets is much larger than the number of underlying factors. For example,
in BARRA’s equity multi-factor model, the covariance structure of thousands of U.S. equities is
explained by 60 industry factors, 12 style factors, and one country factor. This inspires us to
explore the large-universe setting.
Now consider a sequence of problems with an increasing universe of securities, where the nth
problem contains the first n assets. The nth problem is characterized by asset price covariance
matrix Σ(n). Now we can see that the definition in (3.2) is equivalent to (3.19) if the following
decomposition holds:
Σ(n) = L(n)(L(n))> + Ξ(n), (3.20)
where L(n) = (l1, ..., ln) is the factor loadings of the assets and
Ξ(n) , diag(ς21 , ς22 , ..., ς2n)
captures the idiosyncratic risk contribution.
Now we define λ(n)min to be the smallest eigenvalues of L(n)(L(n))>. The notion of large universe
is defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Large Universe). The sequence of problems is said to satisfy the large-universe property
if the following conditions hold:
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3. We will assume that the trading rate of each asset is lower bounded by γ > 0:
inf
j
γj = γ > 0.
The first condition indicates that the idiosyncratic risk of each asset is upper bounded by some
positive number. This condition basically says that the idiosyncratic risk for each asset is small
and hence can be diversified away.
The second condition has two interpretations: firstly, the factors are pervasive, in the sense
that each factor affects almost all of the assets; secondly, there have to be enough variations in the
factor loadings; otherwise, some factors may become redundant as their loadings can be explicitly
calculated from the loadings of other factors. This condition can be linked to the conditions of
arbitrage pricing theorem of Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983). The intuition is that we can
potentially approximate the return of each factor after diversifying away the idiosyncratic risks.
This condition is also related to the literature on estimating factor models, for example Fan et al.
(2013). Those works typically make a stronger assumption, which requires the smallest non-zero
eigenvalue to be linear on n, in order to asymptotically estimate the factor decomposition.
The third condition requires that there be non-vanishing liquidity for each asset.
Proposition 5 (Factor Replicating Portfolio). If the large-universe conditions hold, then for each








1. The portfolio p(i,n)(t) has unit exposure on factor Fi(t):
p(i,n)(t)− Fi(t) = (i,n)(t),
where (i,n)(t) is zero mean and independent of all factor-price processes, and has variance
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upper bounded by












(β(i,n)j )2 = 0.
This proposition indicates that in the large-universe regime, we can construct a sequence of
well-diversified portfolios that eventually converge to the factor returns. The intuition is that as
the number of tradeable assets increases, we can potentially take a small position in each asset and
the idiosyncratic risks will be canceled out due to diversification. The proposition also provides an
upper bound on the idiosyncratic risks for the factor portfolios, which is given by the ratio between
the maximum idiosyncratic variance and the smallest non-zero eigenvalue of L(n)(L(n))>. On one
hand, if the assets have larger idiosyncratic risks, diversification becomes more difficult. On the
other hand, achieving perfect diversification also depends on the assumption that the smallest non-
zero eigenvalue of L(n)(L(n))> goes to infinity, which is guaranteed by the large-universe conditions.
The second part of the proposition implies that β(i,n)j → 0 as n → ∞; hence we can construct
those portfolios without trading too much of any asset. Combined with the third condition for
large-universe regime, this suggests that factor portfolios can be traded very quickly.
3.4.1. Zero-Cost Constrained Trading
To start with, we will adopt the zero-cost constrained trading model where the transaction cost of
each asset is represented by a constraint on its maximum trading rate. For simplicity, we assume
that the Y matrix is just the identity matrix; hence only single assets are traded. We will later
expand the results to the case of liquid bundles.
Now, consider the nth problem where there are n tradeable assets. Suppose we want to liquidate
a portfolio q ∈ Rn with positions in at most the first m assets, i.e.,
qj = 0, ∀j > m. (3.21)
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Further, define J∗n(q) to be the optimal liquidity cost of portfolio q. If we only consider the
idiosyncratic risks, this will result in less risk for the portfolio and hence should provide a lower
bound for liquidity costs. As there is no correlation between assets, the problem will also be
separable and can be solved asset by asset. By applying the results from Section 3.3.1, we have the
following:
Theorem 12 (Lower Bound of Hedging Benefits). If we are allowed to trade other assets during the







The lower bound in Theorem 12 captures the situation where the portfolio has zero exposure to
any of the risk factors. In this case, no other assets are needed for hedging and hence the liquidity
cost consists only of idiosyncratic risks of assets already in the portfolio. Since this situation is of
rare occurrence, the question is whether the lower bound is informative. In the following theorem,
we try to prove that the lower bound in Theorem 12 is tight under the large-universe regime.
Consider the sequence of problems, indexed by n, discussed in the previous section. As we
expand the set of assets that can be used for hedging, the liquidity cost should go down simply
because we have more choices for hedging.
Theorem 13 (Large Universe). If the large-universe property is satisfied, then, asymptotically, the
liquidity cost of any portfolio consisting of finitely many assets will be driven purely by idiosyncratic
risks. More specifically, we have








where q is defined in (3.21), and J∗n(q) represents the optimal costs of liquidating q ∈ RA in An.
Theorem 13 guarantees the convergence of liquidity cost when the number of tradeable assets
goes to infinity. In showing what drives liquidity costs, Theorem 13 is important for two reasons.
Firstly, from a risk perspective, only the idiosyncratic risks matter. Secondly, from a computational
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perspective, we can simply use (3.23) to approximate actual cost if the large-universe setting is valid,
instead of solving some complex dynamic control problem as in (3.11).
However, this only answers part of the question: (3.23) is still impractical if the convergence
is too slow. The following theorem addresses this problem by explicitly bounding the rate of
convergence.
Theorem 14 (Convergence Speed). Asymptotically, the difference between the liquidity cost and the










min|J∗n(q)− J∗∞(q)| <∞. (3.24)
Theorem 14 says that the liquidity cost converges to the theoretical value roughly at the speed




min. For a concrete example, let’s consider a simple case where the factor loadings
of assets are drawn independently from a certain distribution. We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 15 (Random factor loading). If the asset factor loadings are drawn independently from a










n|J∗n(q)− J∗∞(q)| <∞, a.s. (3.26)
Theorem 15 shows that if the asset factor loadings are i.i.d., the liquidity cost converges to the
large-universe approximation at a rate of at least 1/
√
n.
3.4.2. Vanishing Bid-Ask Spread
So far, we have explored the asymptotic features of liquidity costs for the model of zero-cost
constrained trading. Notice that in this case the only cost incurred by hedging comes from the
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extra idiosyncratic risks added by trading other assets. The intuition here is that if there are many
assets to choose from, we can construct a perfect hedging portfolio by trading only a small amount
of each asset. By assuming a certain covariance structure, the large-universe conditions ensure the
availability of such portfolios.
In reality, however, hedging with other assets is almost always associated with additional costs
originating from commission fees, bid-ask spreads, and possibly price impact. In such cases it would
be more interesting if the results for the large-universe regime could be extended to models with
non-zero transaction costs. Fortunately, it can be shown that similar results as in (3.10) can be
extended to a class of models with a separable transaction cost. More specifically, we define the
vanishing bid-ask spread condition as follows.
Definition 6 (Vanishing Bid-Ask Spread). The vanishing bid-ask spread condition holds if the trans-
action cost functional is twice differentiable with
fˆ ′(0) = 0, fˆ(0) = 0.
The idea is that there is no transaction cost for trading very small quantities. One such example
is the case of quadratic transaction cost, which is documented in Gârleanu and Pedersen (2013).












subject to x˙(t) = −Y u(t), ∀ t ≥ 0,




For any liquidation model specified by (3.27), let’s consider the one-dimensional case (n = 1),
where only one asset of size q is traded. Additionally, we assume that the asset has a transaction
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cost parameter ν and a liquidity parameter γ. If we consider only the idiosyncratic risk of this
asset, which is ς2, the corresponding optimal liquidity cost is given by









subject to x˙(t) = −u(t), ∀ t ≥ 0,




It is easy to check that (3.28) satisfies the conditions in 4 and 5. Then the optimal liquidity cost
is just a function of q, ς, γ, ν, and we denote it by J˜∗(q, ς, ν, γ). The specific form of J˜∗(q, ς, ν, γ)
depends on the corresponding transaction cost function fˆ(·), and can be solved through HJB
equations.
Theorem 16 (Generalization). For any liquidation model specified in 3.27, if the transaction cost
functional is twice differentiable with
fˆ ′(0) = 0, fˆ(0) = 0,







J˜∗(qj , ςj , νj , γj), (3.29)
where J∗n(q) represents the optimal liquidity costs for a portfolio q with assets in An.
Theorem 16 says that the liquidity cost of any portfolio consisting of only finitely many assets
is equal to the cost of liquidating each asset individually but with only idiosyncratic risks.
3.4.3. Linear Transaction Costs
The previous theorem depends on the assumption that the average transaction cost diminishes
when the position is very small. Now we consider the case where transaction costs are determined
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In this case, νj can be viewed as the bid-ask spread of asset j. Without hedging, the optimal
strategy is to sell the position as soon as possible (at trading rate limit γ), as is illustrated in
Proposition 10.
Unlike in the setup of the previous model, here hedging with other assets is not cost-free. With
linear transaction costs, the agent can no longer make the transaction cost vanish by trading small
positions. It is always costly to incur any other positions.
Theorem 11 says that hedging is desirable if the position is large. Now, in the case of a large
position, the question is, will a similar version of Theorem 13 hold asymptotically?













This theorem suggests that when the position is extremely large, the market-risk contribution
strictly dominates that of the transaction cost, and the best strategy is to fully hedge.
3.4.4. Hedging with Liquidity Bundles
So far we have studied the case of trading only individual assets. Let us now expand the result to
allow for the trading of liquid bundles. For tractability reasons, we restrict our attention to the
model of zero-cost constrained trading and consider trading only one liquidity bundle, such as an
ETF. Without loss of generality, suppose this ETF covers the first m assets. Then the liquidation
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matrix is given by
Y =

1 0 ... 0 α1
0 1 ... 0 α2
... ... ... ... ...
0 ... 1 ... αm
... ... ... ... ...
0 0 ... 1 0

(3.31)
In addition, we assume that
|αiγETF| < γi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m.
This assumption suggests that the liquidity of asset i from trading the ETF (|αiγETF|) should be
less than the liquidity from trading asset i itself (γi). The assumption is generally true in practice
and enables us to bypass technical difficulties.
In a further attempt to keep things simple, we consider liquidating the position of a single asset.
Theorem 18 (ETF). If the large-universe property is satisfied, then, asymptotically, the cost for






3 (|α1|γETF + γj)q
3
j , (3.32)
where qi = 0, ∀i 6= j.
We can see that (3.32) is very similar to the one-dimensional case of (3.23). First of all,
only idiosyncratic risk matters in the large-universe context. Second, the structure of the optimal
liquidity cost is the same except for different denominators. In particular, |α1|γETF can be viewed
as the liquidity from trading the ETF, while γj is the liquidity from trading asset j itself. This
theorem provides the intuition that when asset space is large enough, adding an ETF is equivalent
to directly increasing the liquidity of the asset.
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3.5. Empirical Results
So far, we have built the framework for estimating liquidity costs for portfolios, and discussed the
implications for the drivers of liquidity costs. However, many of our theoretical results rely heavily
on assumptions about the structure of price covariance matrix, liquidity level of assets, and so on.
For example, one wonders whether the conditions of a large universe are necessarily easy to satisfy
in the real world. Also, it would be interesting to illustrate some of our main findings with concrete
examples. In order to demonstrate these questions, in the remainder of this paper we will calibrate
our model with a small subset of U.S. equities (29 stocks in the utility sector). Specifically, we will
fit the factor model using historical returns.
3.5.1. Overview of the Data Set
As candidates for our calibration, we restrict our attention to the 29 stocks in the Utilities Select
Sector Index, which is one of the eleven Select Sector Indices in S&P 500 that track major economic
segments and are highly liquid. All the stocks included are from the following industries: electric
utilities, water utilities, multi-utilities, independent power producers and energy traders, and gas
utilities. We also take into account the Utilities Select Sector SPDR Fund (or XLU), which is an
ETF seeking to track the performance of the Utilities Select Sector Index. As a result, the universe
of instruments is comprised of 29 individual stocks and one ETF. The market parameters, including
prices, daily returns,2 and daily volume, are obtained from Yahoo Finance for all trading days from
January 1, 2012, to April 1, 2016.
Summary statistics of XLU and its asset holdings (as of April 1, 2016) are given in Table 3.1.
As we can see, the weights of assets are somewhat close. This is a result by construction. Quarterly
rebalancing ensures that no stock is allowed to have a weight greater than 25%, and that the sum
of the stocks with weight greater than 4.8% cannot exceed 50% of the total index weight. All the
individual assets are actively traded, with a daily volume ranging from 7.3×105 shares to 6.8×106
shares. In particular, the ETF (XLU) is highly liquid with an average daily volume of 1.6 × 107
2Prices and returns are adjusted for dividends.
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shares, which is much larger than any individual stocks. The average daily volatility of return for
XLU is much smaller than its underlying assets, which was to be expected from the diversification
it brought. For each asset, the volume traded through the ETF is quite significant and accounts
for a sizable portion of the total daily volume ranging from 7.82% for NRG to 31.49% for NEE.








Volume Trade Through ETF
(%)
Utilities Select Sector SPDR Fund XLU - 49.81 16.08 0.85 -
Ameren Corporation AEE 1.93 50.54 1.68 1.33 19.93
American Electric Power Company Inc. AEP 5.24 67.01 2.86 1.32 23.90
AES Corporation AES 1.26 11.57 6.22 2.04 15.26
American Water Works Company Inc. AWK 2.15 69.50 3.30 1.51 8.19
CMS Energy Corporation CMS 1.89 42.71 2.50 1.31 15.46
CenterPoint Energy Inc. CNP 1.55 21.20 4.62 1.59 13.89
Dominion Resources Inc. D 7.04 75.39 2.56 1.26 31.86
DTE Energy Company DTE 2.64 91.05 1.01 1.20 25.00
Duke Energy Corporation DUK 8.25 81.13 3.43 1.32 25.91
Consolidated Edison Inc. ED 3.60 76.99 1.82 1.36 22.41
Edison International EIX 3.80 71.94 2.10 1.44 22.01
Eversource Energy ES 2.96 58.80 1.77 1.30 24.87
Entergy Corporation ETR 2.25 79.97 1.26 1.39 19.48
Exelon Corporation EXC 5.38 35.66 6.80 1.63 19.38
FirstEnergy Corp. FE 2.46 36.03 3.71 1.62 16.09
AGL Resources Inc. GAS 1.33 65.51 0.73 1.41 24.51
NextEra Energy Inc. NEE 8.98 118.71 2.10 1.31 31.49
NiSource Inc. NI 1.22 23.82 2.24 1.46 20.06
NRG Energy Inc. NRG 0.77 12.77 6.77 3.31 7.82
PG&E Corporation PCG 4.77 59.83 2.57 1.39 27.08
Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated PEG 3.89 47.32 3.07 1.38 23.41
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW 1.37 75.49 0.83 1.31 19.12
PPL Corporation PPL 4.16 38.19 3.93 1.31 24.25
SCANA Corporation SCG 1.60 71.10 0.99 1.34 19.85
Southern Company SO 7.58 51.70 4.53 1.36 28.30
Sempra Energy SRE 4.05 105.92 1.27 1.41 26.29
TECO Energy Inc. TE 1.12 27.56 2.46 1.56 14.47
WEC Energy Group Inc WEC 3.02 59.97 1.88 1.34 23.40
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL 3.39 41.94 3.09 1.32 22.86
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the equity holdings of the assets under discussion. The weights and
prices are as of 04/01/2016. The average daily volume is calculated through the period 01/01/2012 –
04/01/2016. The volatility is defined as the standard deviation of percentage daily returns. The volume
trade through ETF is calculated as |γXLUαj |/γj .
3.5.2. Model Calibration
The main parameters involved in our model are the liquidation matrix Y , covariance matrix of
asset prices Σ, factor loading matrix L, and liquidity parameters γj .
Liquidation matrix and liquidity constraints. The liquidation matrix in the example takes the
same form as in (3.31). The key is to determine parameters {αi}, where αi represents the number
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of shares of asset i contained in one share of the ETF (XLU). More specifically, they are given by





where SETF is the price of the ETF (XLU), Si is the price of asset i, and wi is the dollar weight
of asset i in the ETF. XLU is subjected to quarterly rebalances after the close of business on the
second to last calculation day of March, June, September, and December. As a result, the weights
for each stock can be modified accordingly. But in our analysis, since the liquidation process takes
place only in a short time period, we may safely assume that the structure of the ETF does not
change over time; in other words, {αi} is fixed. It is worth noticing that the weights of all the
individual stocks do not sum up to 100%. The reason is that the ETFs often put away a small
percentage of money in cash. In our analysis, we will neglect those terms as they pose no risk
whatsoever.
In our model of zero-cost constrained trading, the liquidity constraint is defined as the maximum
rate one can trade without incurring any transaction cost. In general, there is no good way to
estimate the threshold without proprietary trading data. For simplicity, we set the threshold at
10% of market trading rate. As we can see from Theorem 13, the exact level of liquidity constraints
does not affect the properties of the solutions. Another issue that could complicate the analysis
is that the market trading rate can be changing over time. Typically, more trading activities are
expected to happen around open and close, and fewer are expected at noon. For tractability, we
will just assume that the liquidity constraint is fixed during the liquidation period we are looking
at. For example, when AEE is trading at an average daily volume of 1.68 × 106 shares per day,
then we set γAEE = 1.68× 105 shares per day.
Covariance structure. We fit a single-factor model (since all the stocks are in the same sector)
using historical daily returns from January 1, 2012 to April 1, 2016. In our analysis, it is achieved
using the principal component method. An in-depth discussion of this method is given in Chapter
9.4 in Tsay (2005).
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3.5.3. Results
We consider liquidating q shares of one individual stock within the asset universe. Now for each
specific stock j, we can consider the following four trading strategies:
1. No Hedging: trade stock j only.
2. Hedging with ETF : trade stock j and hedge with the ETF (XLU).
3. Hedging with Basket: trade stock j and hedge with all other individual stocks.
4. Hedging with All Assets: trade all assets including the ETF.
Without loss of generality, for each stock j we consider the liquidation of a position by 10% of
its daily volume.


















Hedging with All Assets
ς2j
3(|αj |γETF + γj)q
3
Table 3.2: Theoretical results for the four trading strategies.
Table 3.2 provides the theoretical liquidity costs associated with the four strategies, where the
results for the last two strategies are obtained as in the large-universe asymptotic limit. If we
compare the strategy of no hedging with that of hedging with basket, we can see that the former
is proportional to the total variance σ2j , whereas the latter is proportional to the idiosyncratic
variance ς2j .
Table 3.3 shows the numerical results of applying the estimated market parameters. For strategy
3 and strategy 4, we provide two sets of numerical results: the one we call exact is calculated by
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Identifier No Hedging Hedging with ETF Only Hedging with Basket Hedging with All AssetsExact Approximate Exact Approximate
AEE 3.90 1.24 1.06 1.00 0.88 0.83
AEP 4.31 1.52 1.16 1.00 0.92 0.81
AES 1.68 1.15 1.01 1.00 0.87 0.87
AWK 2.04 1.20 1.05 1.00 0.96 0.92
CMS 5.09 1.35 1.11 1.00 0.95 0.87
CNP 2.42 1.22 1.04 1.00 0.90 0.88
D 3.29 1.28 1.10 1.00 0.82 0.76
DTE 5.37 1.31 1.10 1.00 0.87 0.80
DUK 3.61 1.44 1.16 1.00 0.91 0.79
ED 3.21 1.14 1.07 1.00 0.86 0.82
EIX 2.89 1.22 1.07 1.00 0.87 0.82
ES 4.36 1.29 1.09 1.00 0.86 0.80
ETR 2.82 1.16 1.05 1.00 0.87 0.84
EXC 2.10 1.25 1.07 1.00 0.89 0.84
FE 2.12 1.14 1.04 1.00 0.89 0.86
GAS 1.25 1.03 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80
NEE 3.55 1.44 1.15 1.00 0.87 0.76
NI 2.49 1.12 1.02 1.00 0.85 0.83
NRG 1.35 1.13 1.01 1.00 0.93 0.93
PCG 2.68 1.18 1.06 1.00 0.82 0.79
PEG 3.55 1.34 1.10 1.00 0.88 0.81
PNW 4.33 1.18 1.06 1.00 0.88 0.84
PPL 3.22 1.28 1.08 1.00 0.86 0.80
SCG 4.97 1.18 1.07 1.00 0.89 0.83
SO 3.39 1.26 1.11 1.00 0.86 0.78
SRE 2.73 1.22 1.05 1.00 0.83 0.79
TE 1.67 1.08 1.01 1.00 0.88 0.87
WEC 4.41 1.27 1.10 1.00 0.88 0.81
XEL 5.20 1.40 1.13 1.00 0.91 0.81
Table 3.3: Numerical results for the utility-sector example.
solving the discretized version of the optimalization problem as in (3.11); the other one we call
approximated is calculated using the closed-form equations in the large-universe limit as shown in
Table 3.2. From the scaling property in Theorem 7, it is expected that the size of the position we
are liquidating should not affect the comparisons between different trading strategies. To better
illustrate the results, we normalize the results by setting the approximated liquidity cost of strategy
3 (in large-universe asymptotic limit) as a benchmark.
First of all, the benefit from hedging is quite substantial. By hedging with the ETF alone, we
see a significant decrease in all assets, with the ratio of reduction ranging from 16% for NRG to
76% for SCG. This can be explained by the huge liquidity of XLU and the high correlation between
XLU and the individual assets.
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Secondly, hedging with a basket of individual assets is even better than hedging with the ETF
alone for all the assets, though the size of the benefit varies among assets. For AEP, trading with
individual assets further reduces the liquidity cost by about 38% from that of hedging with ETF
only; by contrast, the number is only 3% for GAS.
Thirdly, for strategy hedging with basket, we can see that the approximate values are very close to
the exact ones obtained from solving the dynamic control problem. This shows that the conditions
for the large-universe regime should be satisfied here and (3.23) is indeed a good approximation of
the actual liquidity cost.
Finally, we see that the benefit of adding ETF to the hedging basket is sizable. In most cases,
the reduction of liquidity cost is close to that predicted by (3.32). This shows that in the large-
universe regime, trading ETF is equivalent to providing additional liquidity, since the portfolio’s
market risk exposure has been almost perfectly hedged by the basket of individual stocks.
Finally, we consider the liquidation of a certain position in a representative stock: AEE. To do
so, we add other stocks one by one into the stock basket in alphabetic order. Figure 3.1 shows how
the liquidity cost changes as more and more individual stocks are allowed to be used for hedging.
The convergence of the liquidity cost to the large-universe asymptotic limit is very fast. Figure




min|J∗n(q) − J˜∗(q)|, as defined in Theorem 14. As expected,
the quantity gradually converges to some constant, which shows that the convergence rate of the






Accurately estimating liquidity cost is of central importance in portfolio management, and is espe-
cially crucial when portfolio managers need to unwind large positions. Additionally, liquidity risk
premia can be used to penalize illiquid assets in portfolio construction. We provide a framework
to address the multi-asset optimal execution problem, which is far from being a simple extension
to the single-asset approach currently adopted in practice.
Our results suggest that managing execution at the portfolio level can substantially reduce
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Figure 3.1: Liquidity cost as the number of assets for hedging increases.





















Figure 3.2: Convergence of the liquidity costs.
liquidity cost by taking advantage of the inter-correlation of asset prices. The complex interaction
between asset prices can have a substantial impact on the aggregate portfolio execution cost and
risk. We find that traders can improve execution efficiency by hedging the market risk by trading
correlated assets simultaneously. This advanced strategy is also true even for the execution of single
assets.
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An even more compelling takeaway is that in the large-universe setting where the covariance
structure of asset prices can be explained by only a handful of factors, the liquidity cost is almost
purely driven by idiosyncratic risks. This implies that portfolio managers need to pay more at-
tention to an asset’s idiosyncratic risk as it not only impacts the risk of security return but also
plays a key role in the liquidation process. Additionally, we are able to provide a good closed-form
approximation of the liquidity costs in non-asymptotic situations. This can potentially save one
the trouble of solving a large-scale dynamic control problem.
Finally, our results signify the importance of trading liquid bundles such as ETFs in optimal
liquidation. While previous works are mainly focusing on the hedging benefits of trading liquid
bundles, we are the first to recognize its contribution in terms of liquidity provision. In fact,
the contribution of liquidity provision is often larger than that of hedging risks. In the large-
universe context, we manage to show that trading liquid bundles is almost equivalent to providing
an additional source of liquidity to the underlying asset.
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Chapter 4
A Model for Queue Position Valuation
4.1. Introduction
The way people trade in the financial market has changed fundamentally in the past decades.
Computer technology has revolutionized the financial market: most liquid financial market are now
dominated by electronic trading in central limit order books. Problems around modeling the limit
order books are of paramount importance both in academia and in practice. Most limit order books
are operated under the rule of “price-time prorioty”, in which limit orders are priotirized first based
on price, and then on their arrival time. This structure naturally fit in the queuing models, and
has therefore being studied extensively in the literature.
In this chapter, we study the economic value of a limit order as a function of its position in the
queue. Specifically, we focus on “large-tick asset” where queuing effect is important. We identify
two components that driven the value embedded in queue positions. The first is a informational
component which relates to the adverse selection costs incurred in trading. The second is a dyanmic
component, which accrues over time as you move up in the queue. We are able to develop a tractable
framework that can be easily calibrated with market parameters.
We calibrated our model to a set of U.S. equity data and obtain predictions for order val-
ues at different queue positions. We then validate those predictions by backtesting or simulating
those orders in the real data. We can hypothetically imagine inserting synthetic simulated orders,
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and track how those orders evolve in the limit order books versus real orders. Therefore, we get
nonparametric estimates of the order values and find that they line up very well with our model
predictions. We also find that, for many stocks, the value of queue position are enormous and are
comparable to the spread.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of our approach
and describe the dynamic of the order book. In Section 4.3, we provide closed-form solution for the
value function. In Section 4.4, we applies the model to trading data from NASDAQ. Section 4.5
describes the procedure of backtesting and compare the backtesting results with model predictions.
Section 4.6 concludes and provides practical implications of our analysis. Most proofs appear in
the appendix.
4.2. Model
In the modern equity market, while the price per share differs substantially across assets, the tick
size is artificially fixed. For example, all stocks traded at NYSE have a minimum increment of $0.01.
Large-tick assets, which according to Eisler et al. (2012), are such that “the bid-ask spread rarely
exceeds the minimum tick size”. These are the assets where the tick size is economically significant,
and therefore they are typically traded with the bid-spread equal to the tick size. Another important
characteristic of large-tick assets is that they tend to have large queues in the limit order book.
The reason is that the cost of raising the price by one tick will be very significant. Hence, instead
of competing through price, people tend to queue up. Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between
bid-ask spread and displayed liquidity for various future contracts, and we can see a clear pattern
that queueing effect is more prominent for large-tick assets. In this paper, we will restrict our
attention to the large-tick assets where queueing is important.
For simplicity, we will assume that over the time scale of our model, the bid and ask prices do
not change as the tick size is so big. Also, we will assume that the bid-ask spread is constant and
equal to the tick size (which is almost always true for large-tick assets). Without loss of generality,
we will normalize prices so that the tick size (and hence, the bid-ask spread) is 1. We will focus
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Figure 1: Proportion of time market is not one-tick (log scale), displayed liquidity over
average trade size (log scale), and quote reversion probability, averaged throughout July-
August 2013. Symbols and colors indicate clusters.
Figure 4.1: Various Futures Contracts, July–August 2013 (courtesy Rob Almgren)
only on the ask side of the market, where limit orders are posted to sell the asset and wait to be
executed against market orders from buyers. The case for the bid side can be derived similarly. We
will also consider a single-exchange setup to avoid the complications of merging limit order books
from different exchanges.
As we are interested in situations where the queue length is large, we ignore the integrality issues
and assume that the queue position is continuous. In particul r, we are interested in modeling the
positional value in placing orders of infinitesimal size. We are concerned with short intraday time
horizons over which an order might get executed. Over this short time period, we assume that the
risk-free rate is zero since it doesn’t cost anything to borrow money intraday. Also, we assume that
the agent is risk neutral. Risk neutrality is appropriate for several reasons. First of all, we are
looking at a single order here, which is relatively small compared to the agent’s wealth. Therefore
we can assume that the agent’s utility function is linear for this particular order. Second, we expect
the agent to submit many orders to accumulate a large position. Then the law of large numbers
will kick in, making the agent effectively risk neutral.
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4.2.1. Order Valuation
Our goal is to estimate the value of a limit order, especially as it relates to the queue position of
the order, in a dynamic multi-period setting. To this end, we consider a stylized problem where an
agent arrives seeking to provide liquidity by selling1 an infinitesimal quantity of an asset via a limit
order. The order is placed at time t = 0, at the best ask price PA, and remains in the order book
until either it transacts (i.e., is filled) or until its price changes and (by assumption) the order is
canceled.
To understand the value of the order, it is necessary to develop a model for the value of the
underlying asset. To this end, we assume that the asset will be liquidated at a random future time
T , and at that time will realize a (random) cash flow P . The cash flow P can be viewed as the
fundamental value of the asset. T should be viewed as the time when all information regarding the
price of the underlying asset has been made public. Denote by {Ft} the filtration that represents
the information possessed by the agent, at each time t ≥ 0, and define latent efficient price process
Pt, for t ≥ 0, according to
Pt , E[P |Ft].
We will further assume that the filtration is right-continuous in the sense that Ft = Ft+ for all
t ≥ 0. By construction, Pt is a right-continuous Doob martingale.
Now consider the case where the agent places an infinitesimal order on the ask side. At each
time t, the agent will be willing to sell the asset at prices above Pt, and buy the asset at prices
below Pt. The order will stay in the queue until it is either filled or canceled.
Now, define τ∗ ∈ [0, T ) to be the Ft-measurable stopping time when the order is either filled or
canceled. Notice that since we have defined T to be the time when all information is revealed, the
order should be traded or canceled before then. If the order is filled, the agent is paid PA in exchange
for a short position with (eventual) fundamental value P . Therefore (assuming risk-neutrality and
1This is without loss of generality, since the buying case is symmetric.
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a zero risk-free rate), the value of this order to the agent is given by
Vt , E
[
(PA − P ) I{FILL}
∣∣∣ Ft] ,
for all t ≥ 0. For t ∈ [0, τ∗), since Pt is a right-continuous martingale, we can apply the optional
stopping theorem as in Theorem 3.22 of Karatzas and Shreve (2012):
Vt = E
[
(PA − Pt) I{FILL} − (P − Pt) I{FILL}
∣∣∣ Ft]
= αt (δt − ASt) ,
(4.1)
where
αt , P (FILL | Ft) ,
δt , PA − Pt,
ASt , E [ (Pτ∗ − Pt) | Ft, FILL] .
These stochastic processes have natural interpretations at each time t ∈ [0, τ∗):
• αt is the fill probability of the order.
• δt captures the difference between the order’s posted price PA and the latent efficient price
Pt; we call this the liquidity premium or liquidity spread earned by the order.2
• ASt measures the revision of the agent’s estimate of the asset’s fundamental value from the
present time (Pt) to the time of a fill (Pτ∗), conditional on a fill. Note that ASt = 0 if fills are
independent of the efficient price process. However, in realistic settings with asymmetrically
informed traders, one typically expects that ASt > 0. This is because of the possibility that
the contra-side trader, who is demanding liquidity and paying associated spread costs by
buying at the ask price, is motivated by private information about the fundamental value of
the asset. Hence, trades and innovations of the efficient price process are dependent in a way
2For example, if Pt happened to coincide with the mid-market price, δt would equal a half-spread. The quantity
δt generalizes the notion of a “half-spread” to situations where the expected value of the asset differs from the
mid-market price.
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that is to the detriment of the liquidity provider and, accordingly ASt is known as adverse
selection. Adverse selection is an important issue in evaluating the value of limit orders, and
has been noted in many studies, such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985).
The decomposition in (4.1) can be interpreted informally as an accounting identity that breaks
down the expected profitablity of liquidity provision at the level of an individual order as follows:
order value = fill probability× (liquidity spread premium− adverse selection cost) .
Hollifield et al. (2004) used a similar decomposition to (4.1) to describe the agent’s expected
pay-off in placing the order. Their approach is slightly general as they included an error term to
represent the trader’s private value for the assets. In our model, we are looking from the perspective
of competitive market makers who have no private information. As a result, the private values are
assumed to be zero. Hollifield et al. (2004) do not explicitly consider queue positions, and the fill
probabilities are estimated in a non-parametric way for different price levels. In fact, their approach
finding the trader’s optimal submission strategy across different price levels is fundamentally static,
whereas our approach estimating values of orders at different queue positions uses a dynamic model.
4.2.2. Price Dynamics
We assume that innovations in the latent efficient price process are driven by two types of discrete
exogenous events, trades and price jumps. Trades correspond to the arrival of an impatient buyer
(resp., seller), who demands immediate liquidity and is matched with a seller (resp., buyer) at the
best ask (resp., bid) price. For the ith trade, denote its arrival time by τui > 0 and its signed3 trade
size by ui ∈ R. Price jumps, on the other hand, represent an instant in time at which price levels
across the board shift up (resp., down) due to the arrival of new information. In an upward (resp.,
downward) jump, we assume that all orders at the best ask (resp., best bid) price are filled. We
denote the arrival time of the kth jump by τJk and its size by Jk.
3The case where ui < 0 represents a market order to sell, while ui > 0 represents a market order to buy.
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We posit the following dynamics for the latent efficient price:









or, equivalently, for liquidity premium:









for t ∈ [0, τ∗). Accordingly, we make the following assumptions:
• Linear price impact. The ith trade impacts the latent efficient price by λui; i.e., there is a
permanent linear price impact. The quantity λ > 0 captures the sensitivity of prices to trade
size. This is consistent with the strategic model of Kyle (1985), where such price impact
results from asymmetrically informed traders. Although our model is reduced form in that
the price impact is specified exogenously, the spirit of it is that large trades are more likely
to be due to informed traders, and hence have a greater impact on the posterior beliefs of the
trader.
• Poisson trade arrivals. We will assume that the trade times {τui } are Poisson arrivals with
rate µ > 0.
• I.i.d. trade sizes. We will assume that the trade sizes {ui} are independent and identically
distributed with probability density function f(·) over R. In order to ensure that Pt is a
martingale, we will require that E[ui] = 0. To avoid technicalities, we further assume that
f(·) is continuous and f(u) > 0 for all u ∈ R; i.e., the support of the distribution is all of R.
• Poisson jump arrivals. We will assume that the jump times {τJk } are Poisson arrivals with
rate γ > 0.
• I.i.d. jump sizes. We will assume that the jump sizes {Jk} are independent and identically
distributed. In order to ensure that Pt is a martingale, we require that E[Jk] = 0.
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We require that arrival times, trade sizes, and jump sizes be Ft-measureable, so that Pt is an
Ft-adapted process with sample paths that are right continuous with left limits (RCLL) — in fact,
Pt is a piecewise constant pure jump process.
In equation (4.2), we are assuming that a price moves for two reasons. First of all, a price moves
when trades empty the queue at a certain price level. Second, a price moves not because of trading
but because of the arrival of new information; this is what we call a jump. For example, a correlated
asset move or a corporate news release may move the price through cancellation of existing orders
or placement of new orders at other price levels. Another reason why we are explicitly modeling
jumps is that price changes are better modeled by jumps than by other forms of continuous noise
for short periods of time, see Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004).
Note that the dynamics of Pt are determined by the arrival rate parameters (λ, µ, γ) ∈ R3+ and
the distributions of trade sizes and jump sizes. An application of the law of total variance yields,






where σ2u , Var(u) is the variance of trade sizes and σ2J , Var(J) is the variance of jump sizes.





µλ2σ2u + γσ2J .
4.2.3. Limit Order Book Dynamics
The limit order is placed at the best ask price PA, and remains in the order book either untill it is
filled, or until its price changes and (by assumption) it is canceled. Moreover, during the time that
is active, the order moves toward the front of its position, as orders with greater queue priority are
filled or cancelled, according to price-time priority rules.
Specifically, subsequent to its placement, denote the queue position of the limit order by qt ∈
Q , R+ ∪ {FILL,CANCEL}. Specifically, at each time t ∈ [0, τ∗) at which the order has not been
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filled or canceled, qt ∈ R+ and the quantity qt of asset shares4, available for sale at the best ask
price, is of greater priority than the limit order. If the order has been filled (resp., canceled) prior
to time t, then qt = FILL (resp., qt = CANCEL). Until the order is filled or canceled, the queue
position qt evolves according to a sequence of arrivals of one of the following types of events at each
event time τ > 0:
1. A trade occurs with size ui ∈ R. As per equation (4.2), the liquidity spread evolves according
to
δτ = δτ− − λui.
For the evolution of the queue position, there are three cases:
(a) ui ∈ [qτ−,∞). In this case, the quantity of shares is purchased at the best ask price
that exceeds the limit order queue position; hence, the order is filled and realizes a final
expected value of
Vτ = E[PA − P |Fτ ] = δτ = δτ− − λui,
where, for the last inequality, we apply the price dynamics of equation (4.2).
(b) ui ∈ [0, qτ−). In this case, the quantity of shares is purchased at the best ask price but
it is insufficient to result in a fill; however, the order position improves according to
qτ = qτ− − ui > 0.
(c) ui ∈ (−∞, 0). In this case, the quantity of shares is purchase; hence the queue position
qτ remains fixed.
2. A price jump occurs with size Jk ∈ R. As per equation (4.2), the liquidity spread evolves
according to
δτ = δτ− − Jk.
For the evolution of the queue position, there are two cases:
4Here we ignore integrality issues as we are considering large queue length.
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(a) Jk > 0. Under a positive price jump, the order is assumed to be filled and realizes a
final expected value of
Vτ = E[PA − P |Fτ ] = δτ = δτ− − Jk.
(b) Jk > 0. Under a negative price jump, the price levels shift down and the order is assumed
to be canceled, realizing a final value of VT = 0.
3. The next event is the cancellation of a quantity of higher priority at the best ask price level.
We will describe the underlying assumptions of cancellation model shortly, but for now it
suffices to note that the ith cancellation event is associated with a proportion `i ∈ [0, 1], and
therefore a fraction 1 − `i of the shares with higher priority at the best ask price level are
canceled. Hence,
qτ = `iqτ−.
While the impact of trades is easy to model with the FIFO rule, cancellations can happen at
any position in the queue. Moreover, we are interested only in the cancellations that happened in
front of the current position. In order to model cancellations, we introduce the two assumptions
below.
Proportional and Uniform Cancellations. We will assume that after each cancellation on the ask
side, the ask queue is homogeneously contracted by a certain proportion `, where {`i} are i.i.d. with
continuous p.d.f. g(·) over [0, 1]. Further, cancellations occur on the ask side at times associated
with a Poisson process of rate η+. Additionally, we assume that the cancellation happens uniformly
across different queue positions. Under this assumption, the queue position of a limit order will be
updated from q to `iq after the ith cancellation.
Uninformed Cancellations. We assume that cancellations happen randomly and possess no
extra information. Some empirical work, such as Cont et al. (2014), has argued that there is a
correlation between price moves and cancellations; however, the market impact of cancellations
should be much smaller than that of market orders and hence we will neglect this effect due to its
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technicality.
All things being equal, we expect cancellations to be larger when the queue is larger. Therefore,
instead of modeling both the size and the position of cancellations, we assume proportional cancel-
lations with a specific distribution fitted from the data. The order dynamics with cancellations is
then presented as follows:
1. If the cancellation happens on the ask side with cancellation fraction `, then the queue position
of the order (currently q) is assumed to shrink to `q.
2. If the cancellation happens on the bid side, then the referenced order is not affected at all.
4.3. Analysis
Now we consider the value of the queue position from the perspective of the agent. In Section 4.2.1,
we defined the value of a limit order. In this section, under the dynamics described in Section 4.2.2
and Section 4.2.3, we will characterize this value. In what follows, we assume that the agent places
his order at time 0.
Naturally, the value of a limit order is determined by the price at which the order is placed
(PA), the latent efficient price (Pt) at the time it is executed (resp., canceled), and the probability
of execution. Because our price dynamics do not depend on price levels, we can consider prices
relative to the ask price of time zero (PA), which is denoted by δt. In addition, the probability of
execution is a function of queue position according to the order dynamics in our model. Hence the
value of a limit order can be uniquely determined by the state variable (δ, q). Given that all the
events in our model (trades, price jumps, and cancellations) are assumed to have Poisson arrival
times, the evolution of state variable (δ, q) over time can be viewed as a continuous-time Markov
chain. By setting the uniformization parameter as ζ = µ+ γ + η+, we can transfer the continuous-
time Markov chain to a discrete-time Markov chain (Chapter 5.8 in Ross (1996)). Following our
discussion in Section 4.2.3, the transitions of states are as follows:
• With probability µζ , the next event will be a trade. Suppose that the trade size is u.
91
CHAPTER 4. A MODEL FOR QUEUE POSITION VALUATION
1. If u < 0, the state will be updated to (q, δ − λu).
2. If 0 ≤ u < q, the state will be updated to (q − u, δ − λu).
3. If u ≥ q, the order value is realized at δ − λu.
• With probability γζ , the next event will be a price jump, with jump size J .
1. If J > 0, the order value is realized at δ − J .
2. If J ≤ 0, the order value is realized at 0.
• With probability η+ζ , the next event will be a cancellation, with cancellation fraction `. The
state will be updated to (`q, δ), where ` is the proportion that remains after the cancellation.
Putting together all of the above, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The order value process Vt takes the form
Vt = V (qt, δt),
for t ∈ [0, τ∗), where V (·) is the unique solution of the equation















E` [V (`q, δ)] ,
(4.4)
for all (q, δ) ∈ R+ × R.
In what follows, define the quantities
p+u , P(u > 0), u¯+ , E[uI{u>0}], p+J , P(J > 0), J¯+ , E[JI{J>0}].
Theorem 19 (Value Function for Market Maker). The value function V (q, δ) is linear in δ; that is,
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it takes the form
V (q, δ) = α(q)δ − β(q), (4.5)
where the functions α : R+ → R and β : R+ → R are uniquely determined by the integral equations
α(q) = µ
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Theorem 19 shows that the value function is quasi-linear on the premium δ while the coefficients
are determined by the queue position. Specifically, if the order is executed, the agent will earn the
premium δ but incur cost β(q); if the order is not executed, the order value is just zero. Note that
the Volterra integral equation (4.6) can be readily solved numerically.
In order to estimate the value function, the following parameters need to be obtained from data:
1. γ/µ, ratio of arrival rate of jumps to arrival rate of trades.
2. η+/µ, ratio of arrival rate of cancellations to arrival rate of trades.
3. f(·), distribution of trade size.
4. λ, price impact coefficient.
5. p+J = P (Ji > 0), probability that a price jump is positive.
6. J¯+/p+J = E[Ji|Ji > 0], expected value of a positive jump.
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Notice that the value function is determined by the ratio of arrival rates rather than their
absolute value. Intuitively, ratios of arrival rates determine whether an order is executed, while
their absolute values determine when that happens. As we do not consider the value of time,
absolute values of arrival rates do not change the value of the order. Additionally, we need only
the first moment of price jumps rather than their distribution. This is because the size of a price
jump is used only to calculate the expected order value at the time that the price jump happens.
The distribution of trade size is important as it helps to determine the optionality of an order that
has been executed. The price impact coefficient captures the adverse selection cost due to trading,
and hence appears only in the expression of β(·).
We can now establish the following properties of α(·) and β(·).
Theorem 20. 1. Compared with equation (4.1), we have
αt = α(q), ASt =
β(q)
α(q) .
2. The probability of execution α(q) is non-increasing in queue position.
3. The adverse selection is positive
β(q)/α(q) > 0.




J , limq→∞β(q) = J¯
+.
The first statement provides the intuition for the two coefficients. A by-product of the proof
shows that the quasi-linear form of the value function in equation (4.6) is a general result that does
not require a Poisson arrival of events.
The second statement shows that the probability of execution is smaller for orders with a larger
queue position. This is expected due to the FIFO rule.
The third statement suggests that the adverse selection cost is always positive, which is in
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line with intuition. Specifically, adverse selection can be broken down into two parts. The first
part originates from price jumps, and the second comes from the asymmetric information between
liquidity takers and liquidity providers.
The last statement provides the asymptotic behavior of the value function when there is no
cancellation. Intuitively, if the queue position is extremely large, it is unlikely that the order will
be executed by trades. Hence the probability of execution (α(q)) is just the probability of a positive
price jump. The case with cancellations is technically complicated as we assume that cancellations
cause a shrinking of the queue length.
While in general it’s difficult to obtain close-form solutions to Volterra integral equations, some
special cases can be solved using Laplace transform. Theorem 21 provides such an example.
Theorem 21 (Exponential Trade Sizes). Suppose there are no cancellations and that the trades sizes
follow the exponential distribution with parameter θ > 0, i.e.,
f(u) , θ2e
−θ|u|,
for u ∈ R. Then, the value function is given by V (δ, q) = α(q)δ − β(q), where




β(q) = J¯+(1− µ





−bq + λ(γ − µ)γ(p
+
J − 1)
2(γ + µ/2)3 qe
−bq, (4.10)
for all q ≥ 0, where b , (γ+ζ)θµ/2+γ .
4.4. Empirical Calibration
Having laid the framework, we now test our model using NASDAQ ITCH data for large-tick U.S.m
stocks with high liquidity. NASDAQ ITCH data is a so-called market-by-order data feed. As
opposed to market-by-level data, which displays orders accumulated on price, market-by-order data
contains all order-book events including limit order postings, trades, and limit order cancellations.
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Market-by-order data makes it possible to reconstruct the limit order book at any given time and
hence can be used to view queue position and size of individual orders at a price while remaining
anonymous.
One advantage of our model is that it offers predictions of order value at different positions in
the queue as a function of market primitives, and hence can be easily calibrated. In this section,
we will take Bank of America (BAC) as an example to illustrate our estimation process and model
results. We will first describe the calibration of our model parameters, and then solve for the
predicted queue position values using the market primitives obtained.
4.4.1. Data Overview
Our attention is restricted to large-tick assets, where the queueing effect is large. Bank of America
(BAC) is one of the most liquid stocks traded, with an average daily volume of 88 million shares
in August 2013. The bid-ask spread is almost always equal to one tick and is large (about 7 basis
points) relative to its price. Hence BAC qualifies as a large-tick asset.
A stock can be traded on multiple exchanges simultaneously. To avoid the complexity of aggre-
gating multiple limit order books, we consider only the NASDAQ order book by using ITCH data,
which provides historical data for full order depth. ITCH enables us to track the status of each
order from the time it is placed to the time it is either executed or canceled. We use the database
of Yahoo Finance for daily closing prices.
4.4.2. Calibrating Parameters
The main parameters involved in our model are: distribution of order size, trade arrival rate µ,
price jump arrival rate γ, cancellation arrival rate η, market impact λ, and jump size J . These
parameters exhibit significant day-to-day heterogeneity as some days are more active than others.
In what follows, these parameters will be estimated on a daily basis and we will see how their
heterogeneity changes order values.
Price jumps are instances when the ask or the bid price changes. A trade happens when a
market order (or a marketable limit order) is executed with existing limit orders. Sometimes trades
96
CHAPTER 4. A MODEL FOR QUEUE POSITION VALUATION
and price jumps can coincide. This happens when an execution is large enough to eliminate the
entire queue and cause a price jump. In the following analysis, trades will refer to executions that
do not cause price moves, while executions that are large enough to deplete the queue will be
counted as price jumps. As a result, a price jump can come in the form of an order being executed
with arbitrary size.
Price Jumps. In our settings, the size of price jumps is defined by changes in the latent
efficient price. Since the latent efficient price is not observable, we assume that the price ∆t later
is an unbiased estimate of the latent price after a jump.5 The intuition here is that the market
will take some time (∆t) to digest and factor in the information. Hence, the size of a price jump is
calculated as the price change ∆t after the price moves. ∆t is expected to differ among stocks due
to differences in factors such as liquidity. Here, we take ∆t to be proportional to the expected time
interval between price jumps. Notice that in this case the jump size can be smaller than one tick
when a reversion happens within ∆t. The number of price jumps is counted separately for both
the ask side and the bid side, and then the average is taken. The arrival rate for price jumps is
calculated simply by counting price jumps.
Trades. In our model, trade size is defined as the size of an aggressive market order. In
electronic markets, once an aggressive market order comes, it is matched with the very first limit
order in the queue. If, however, the aggressive market order is too large to be filled with a single
limit order, it may trade with multiple resting limit orders, resulting in multiple individual fills.
Notice that what we observe from the ITCH data feeds are individual fills, and therefore it is
necessary to combine these fills to reconstruct the size of the original market order. We take a time
window of two milliseconds, and calculate the order size by putting together the trades of the same
side within that time window. If the price changes during that time, we consider the execution to
be a price jump.
Our empirical results show that the shape of order size distribution closely resembles a log-
normal distribution, which is consistent with findings in Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a). In particular,
we obtained the MLE estimate of the mean and standard deviation. We obtained the arrival rate,
5In our analysis, ∆t is set at one minute.
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however, in a much more straightforward manner, we simply counted the number of trades.
Cancellations. With market-by-order data, we can keep close track of the position and size of
every canceled order. As we mentioned in Section 4.3, we view each cancellation as a contraction
of the whole queue. In other words, we assume that each cancellation decreases the queue size
uniformly by a certain proportion l. We then fit the cancellation proportion l using Beta distri-
bution. Note that this requires an underlying assumption that the positions where cancellations
happen follow a uniform distribution. In reality, this doesn’t always hold as cancellations tend
to concentrate at the end of the queue. However, due to the technicality of taking into account
cancellation positions, we have to trade some accuracy for an empirically solvable model.
Market Impact. The calibration of market impact has always been of great interest in the
market microstructure literature. Kyle (1985) formulated a linear market impact in a continuous-
time theoretical model. He argued that the price impact of one unit of asset is determined by the
fundamental volatility and variance of order-flow imbalance. Other researchers, such as Breen et al.
(2002), took a purely empirical approach by regressing the price changes on order-flow imbalances.
In this paper, we derive the market impact parameter by following the market invariant approach
of Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a). Specifically, Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a) proposed a model in






where C is some known constant,6 P is the asset price, σ is the asset’s volatility of daily return,
and V is the daily trading volume (in shares).
Liquidity Premium. In reality, the latent price is not observable. We will assume that on
average it can be approximated by the mid-price. In other words, we will assume that the liquidity
premiumis is a half-spread. However, we will make an adjustment in order to factor in a liquidity
rebate of 0.3 ticks offered by NASDAQ. The rebate is offered by the exchange in order to encourage
6C = 0.0156 according to Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016a).
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market participants to provide liquidity. Hence the liquidity premium is just
δ0 = (half-spread) + (rebate) = 0.8(ticks).
Table 4.1 provides the estimated parameters for Bank of America over 22 trading days. As
we can see, the average jump size is very close to one tick, which means that the price process is
driven primarily by single tick jumps. Note that the jump size can be less than one tick as we
approximate it as the price change ∆t after the price moves. Our empirical findings show that the
order size distribution is roughly consistent across trading days. The market impact parameter λ
too is subject to very little variation across trading days. The only parameters with much variation
from day to day are the ratios between arrival rates (γ/µ, η/µ), which, as will see, are the driving




















(/min) (shares) (shares) (/min) (shares) (/min) (ticks) (shares)
8/30/13 1.43 2270 4793 148.3 1971 0.85 0.86 3.91 46092
8/29/13 1.25 2635 6535 128.8 2103 0.57 0.86 3.97 48454
8/28/13 1.55 2526 4463 140.1 2140 0.79 1.12 4.41 52845
8/27/13 2.25 2435 5395 178.2 2049 1.05 0.91 4.79 48526
8/26/13 1.27 2481 5441 95.5 2114 0.51 0.82 3.53 52434
8/23/13 1.11 2058 3922 114.5 2340 0.56 0.85 3.68 59337
8/22/13 1.20 2998 6082 95.6 1835 0.53 0.92 3.84 37617
8/21/13 1.74 2091 4329 163.7 2134 1.39 1.14 3.93 42240
8/20/13 1.38 3669 7157 127.8 1970 0.95 1.03 4.19 46665
8/19/13 1.21 1979 3676 126.5 1868 0.72 0.84 4.87 45502
8/16/13 1.26 2223 4512 134.5 1737 0.67 0.94 5.37 45480
8/15/13 1.94 1582 3037 165.0 1698 0.82 0.75 5.23 46627
8/14/13 1.37 2034 4449 122.5 1455 0.90 0.95 4.51 33647
8/13/13 1.54 2327 5008 107.8 1628 0.72 1.09 4.68 37320
8/12/13 1.08 2426 4977 103.5 1887 0.49 0.92 4.39 60888
8/9/13 1.65 2762 5986 122.4 1875 0.71 0.91 4.81 50032
8/8/13 1.29 2303 4351 108.4 1764 0.95 1.25 5.16 38409
8/7/13 1.99 2494 5106 130.5 2303 1.01 0.91 5.99 53673
8/6/13 1.47 2610 5692 85.8 1930 0.55 0.93 5.19 50083
8/5/13 0.81 1598 2941 88.3 1502 0.44 0.78 4.59 38647
8/2/13 1.57 2039 4545 112.4 1511 0.53 0.86 5.05 47777
8/1/13 1.58 2853 7978 120.0 1854 0.71 0.85 5.52 51163
Table 4.1: Estimated market parameters for BAC in a month. λ is estimated as the price impact in
basis points for one percent of daily volume. Note that here we consider only shares traded on NASDAQ.
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4.4.3. Observations
Given the market parameters estimated above, the main output of our model is the value function of
queue position, which can be obtained by numerically solving equation (4.6) and (4.7) in Section 4.3.
Figure 4.2 provides the plots of the value function, execution probability, and adverse selection for
BAC on two representative trading days (8/9/2013 and 8/20/2013).
First, as predicted by Theorem 20, the probability of execution is decreasing with queue length
and becomes quite flat when the queue length is large. Intuitively, when the queue length is
extremely large, the order on the ask side can be executed only by positive price jumps. Hence,
the execution probability should converge toward the probability of a positive price jump (p+J as
in Theorem 20). Second, the adverse selection cost remains positive and is increasing with queue
length. Intuitively, this is because orders at the end of a large queue are more likely to be executed
against a large trade. With our assumption of linear price impact, large trades translate to higher
adverse selection costs. Third, the order value curve is decreasing as the queue gets longer. From
equation (4.1), we can see that the decreasing value curve is due to a combined effect of decreasing
execution probability and increasing adverse selection cost. Fourth, the value difference between
an order placed at the very front of the queue and an order placed in a queue length of average
was about 0.26 ticks on 8/9/2013 and 0.21 ticks on 8/20/2013, which is comparable to the bid-ask
spread. This shows that the queue’s positional value cannot be neglected in higher- level control
problems such as optimal execution and market making. Finally, Figure 4.2 provides comparisons
of model outputs on two different trading days. We can see that orders in the same queue position
were worth less on 8/20/2013, and had a lower fill probability. This is because the ratio of arrival
rate γ/µ was significantly higher on 8/20/2013 (0.69) than on 8/9/2013 (0.43). Intuitively, large
γ/µ means that the order is less likely to be executed against a trade before the price changes, and
hence translate to a lower fill probability.
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(a) Order value as a function of queue position
(b) Fill probability as a function of queue position
(c) Adverse selection as a function of queue position
08/09/2013 08/20/2013
Figure 4.2: Model outputs as functions of queue positions on two different trading days (08/09/2013
and 08/20/2013). The red dots represent the average queue length of that trading day.
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($) ($) ($) (daily) (shares, ×106)
Bank of America BAC NYSE 14.11 14.95 1.017 1.2% 87.9
Cisco CSCO NASDAQ 23.31 26.38 0.996 1.0% 38.7
General Electric GE NYSE 23.11 24.70 1.002 0.9% 29.6
Ford F NYSE 15.88 17.50 1.005 1.4% 33.6
Intel INTC NASDAQ 21.90 23.22 1.005 1.1% 24.5
Pfizer PFE NYSE 28.00 29.37 1.007 0.7% 23.3
Petroleo Brasilleiro PBR NYSE 13.39 14.98 1.010 2.6% 17.9
iShares MSCI Emerging Markets EEM NYSE 37.35 40.10 1.006 1.2% 64.1
iShares MSCI EAFE EFA NYSE 59.17 62.10 1.021 0.7% 14.4
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for 9 stocks over the 21 trading days of August 2013. The average
bid/ask spread is defined as the time average computed from the ITCH data. The volatility is defined
as the standard deviation of percentage daily returns. All other statistics were retrieved from Yahoo
Finance.
4.5. Empirical Validation: Backtesting
In the previous section, we calibrated a parametric model to estimate the positional value of limit
orders using market data. Now we want to verify these predictions using a non-parametric model
based on backtesting. The difficulty is that the order value cannot be measured by the profitability
of the orders in the limit order book, since actual orders may have private information. Therefore,
instead of actual orders, we have to use randomly placed artificial orders.
Market-by-order data enables us to simulate the life-span of each artificial order in the limit
order book. We can then calculate various statistics such as order value and fill probability for orders
at different positions. We then compare the backtesting results with the parametric estimations.
More specifically, we restrict our attention to 9 highly liquid U.S. equities or ETFs with a bid/ask
spread close to 1 tick. A list of the stocks and their descriptive statistics are given in Table 4.2.
4.5.1. Backtesting Simulation
The technique of backtesting is widely used in the financial industry to test a predictive model with
existing historical data. Our paper benefited from the advantage of accessing ITCH data, a source
of market-by-order data provided by NASDAQ. With full information on historical order/trade
data, we were able to construct a simulator to backtest our proposed valuation model. Backtesting
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with artificial orders poses one challenge: real orders may influence other market participants.
Here we will assume that all the artificial orders are of infinitesimal size and hence have no market
impact. This is actually in accordance with our model setup. First, the historical data will be used
to create the dynamics of order books; then artificial orders will be placed and processed according
to market rules; finally, the value of the artificial orders will be calculated.
Placement of Artificial Orders. We start by defining two types of artificial orders based on
the position at which they are inserted.
• Regular orders are orders that are appended to the end of the queue at the current best price.
The name regular orders comes from the fact that these orders are placed according to the
FIFO rule.
• Touch orders are orders that are inserted at the very front of the queue at the current best
price. These orders are used to evaluate the value of being placed at the front of the queue.
Comparing touch orders with regular orders will help to illustrate the magnitude of the effect
of queue positions.
In the simulation, we associate each real limit order with an entry-time stamp to keep track of
the time that the order entered the order book. The side (bid or ask) of each artificial order is
randomly picked. Suppose that it is an ask order; then its evolution in the limit order book will be
as follows.
• The artificial order wakes up at a random time, and is inserted in the queue according to its
type.
• The process of artificial orders follows the market rule of price/time priority. We start updat-
ing the limit order book according to the real data until one of the following events occurs.
1. New order arrival: If a new limit order is added to the same side at a better price
(lower for the ask side, higher for the bid side) than that of the artificial order, then the
artificial order will no longer be at the best price, and we will assume that it is canceled
immediately.
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2. Fill: If a limit order arrives after the artificial order is filled, we will assume that the
artificial order is also filled.
3. Cancellation: If the price moves because all other orders in the queue are canceled (which
is rare), we will assume that the artificial order is canceled as well.
We ignore the first and last half hours of the trading day because the market tends to be very
volatile during these two periods. Accordingly, we pick 1000 time points uniformly at random
between 10:00 and 15:30 on each trading day on the random side of the market.
Order Valuation. If the artificial order is canceled then it possesses no value. If, however,
the artificial order is filled then its value will be the difference between the execution price and the
fundamental value of the asset. In order to backtest order values at different positions, we need
to determine the fundamental value. Since the fundamental value cannot be observed directly in
the historical data, we need to calibrate it through a tractable valuation process. In this paper,
we assume that the mid-price one minute after the order’s execution is an unbiased estimate of
its fundamental value. This is certainly a noisy approximation and lots of data are needed for a
reasonably accurate estimate, which is why we choose to estimate the average order value over 30
trading days instead of using a shorter period.
4.5.2. Observations
Table 4.3 shows the comparison of the results from backtesting and model outputs. The order value
measures the value of regular orders that are placed at the end of the queue, while the touch value
measures the value of touch orders placed at the very front of the queue.
We can see that the values estimated from our model are very close to the backtesting results.
Further, if we break down the value into fill probability and adverse selection cost, we can see that
the values are still close. This shows that our model provides a good approximation of the value of
queue positions.
Notice that the difference between the value of touch orders and the value of regular orders
provides good intuitions about the magnitude of the value of queue positions. First of all, the value
of orders placed at the front of the queue is always larger than the value of orders placed at the
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Symbol Order Value Fill Probability Adverse Selection Touch Value
Model Simulation Model Simulation Model Simulation Model Simulation
(ticks) (ticks) (ticks) (ticks) (ticks) (ticks)
BAC 0.14 0.14 0.62 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.36 0.31
CSCO 0.08 0.07 0.63 0.59 0.68 0.68 0.24 0.21
GE 0.08 0.09 0.62 0.60 0.67 0.65 0.19 0.23
F 0.13 0.15 0.65 0.64 0.60 0.53 0.24 0.23
INTC 0.11 0.09 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.56 0.28 0.23
PFE 0.12 0.11 0.63 0.58 0.62 0.61 0.16 0.21
PBR -0.03 -0.04 0.57 0.53 0.85 0.89 0.03 0.03
EMM 0.07 0.08 0.63 0.63 0.69 0.64 0.21 0.15
EFA 0.03 0.04 0.57 0.53 0.74 0.73 0.06 0.09
Table 4.3: Estimated model values vs. simulation values. All the values above were calculated as the
average across 30 trading days. Touch value refers to the value of orders at the very front of the queue.
end. This shows that better queue position does carry an advantage. Second, the magnitude of the
gap differed between symbols. For some symbols, such as BAC and CSCO, the gap can be very
large and comparable to the bid ask spread (> 0.1 ticks). For others, such as PFE and PBR, the
gap is less prominent (< 0.1 ticks).
4.5.3. Discussion
In this section, we provide a framework based on backtesting to estimate the value of queue po-
sitions. This non-parametric approach enables us to test the accuracy of our model. But if a
non-parametric model is available, why do we still need a parametric one, such as the one discussed
in this paper? The reasons are as follows. In the backtest, artificial orders are placed randomly
across time to simulate a real situation. As a result, it can be used only to estimate the average
value across time. However, market parameters, such as arrival rates of order book events, are
constantly changing and backtesting cannot capture that variation. Additionally, the estimates
from our model are conditional on market primitives and hence provide more precise predictions
in real time.
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4.6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we exhibited a dynamic model for valuing queue position in limit order books. We
provided analytic evidence for sizable difference in values for orders at different queue positions.
We specifically quantified the disadvantage of bad queue positions that originate from decreasing
execution probability and increasing adverse selection costs.
The formulation of the model is based entirely on observable quantities so that the parameters
can be estimated from market data. This tractability allowed us to calibrate our model empirically.
We further validated the model by comparing the outputs with results from backtesting simulations.
This analysis has practical implications for both market participants and regulators.
1. For large tick-size assets, queueing effects can be very significant.
2. Accounting for queue position cannot be ignored when solving market making or algorithmic
trading problems. This gives rise to various exotic order types that enable traders to jump
to better queue positions. If we look from the other direction, we may conclude that trades
need to respond faster to jump to the front of the queue. In this respect, our analysis partly
explains the “speed competition” between high-frequency trading firms.
3. The value embedded in the queue position rewards the trading speed of high-frequency firms.
This creates a disadvantage for individual traders who have less or no access to fast-trading
technologies. From a regulatory level, an important question is whether this time-price pri-
ority rule is a good mechanism for organizing exchanges of large-tick assets.
4. One possible future research direction is to expand the model to accommodate other market
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A.1. Additional Proofs for Chapter 2
Theorem 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium with linear
price impact functions is that the two CCPs have common views on market impact, i.e., that
G1 = G2 , G.
In this case, all equilibria are determined by the symmetric, positive definite solutions F1, F2 ∈
Rm×m to the equation
G−1 = F−11 + F−12 . (2.8)
Proof. We will make frequent use of the fact that our definitions require the matrices Fi and Gi
to be symmetric and positive definite.
Necessity. Suppose (x1, x2, F1, F2) defines an equilibrium.
The first-order conditions for the clearing member’s optimization problem (2.9) yield
x1 = (F1 + F2)−1F2x. (A.1)
The sufficient margin condition for CCP 1 implies
x>1 G1x = x>1 F1x1,
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for all x. We can use (A.1) to write this as
x>1 G1(F1 + F2)F−12 x1 = x>1 F1x1. (A.2)
We need this to hold for all x1 ∈ Rm because from (A.1) we see that x1 ranges over all of Rm as x
does. Thus, the matrices on the two sides of (A.2) must have the same symmetric parts. Applying










1 F2 + F2F−11 G2) +G2.



















Each of these equations has the form
B = AX +X>A>
According to Braden (1998, Theorem 1), the solutions to (A.3) and (A.4) take the following form:
for some skew-symmetric1 matrices Q1, Q2,











(I + F1F−12 )−1 = F2(F2 + F1)−1, (I + F2F−11 )−1 = F1(F2 + F1)−1,














Next observe that for any symmetric, invertible A,B,






Thus, we can write (A.5)–(A.6) as










We will show that Q1 = Q2 = 0. It will then follow that
G1 = (F−11 + F−12 )−1 = G2 , G
and therefore
G−1 = F−11 + F−12 . (A.9)
It remains to show that Q1 = Q2 = 0. Observe that the first term on the right side of (A.7)
and (A.8) is symmetric, so the last term must be symmetric as well. Also, because the Fi are
positive definite, F1F−12 and F2F−11 have positive eigenvalues (even though they are not necessarily
positive definite). Thus, it suffices to show that if Q is skew-symmetric and X = F1F−12 has positive
eigenvalues, then Q(I +X) cannot be symmetric unless Q = 0.
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If Q(I +X) is symmetric, Q+QX = −Q+X>Q> and
2Q = (X>Q> −QX). (A.10)














where 0k×k is a block of zeros, for some k. We always have m− k even, and k may be zero if m is
even. We can write (A.10) as
2UΛU> = (X>UΛ>U> − UΛU>X)
and then
2Λ = (U>X>UΛ> − ΛU>XU) = (X˜>Λ> − ΛX˜),
where X˜ has the same eigenvalues as X. So, it suffices to consider (A.10) in the case Q = Λ,
2Λ = (X>Λ> − ΛX). (A.11)





If k = 0, there is nothing to prove, so suppose k ≥ 1. Consider any Xij with i ≤ m − k and
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j > m− k. Denote by Λ`i the unique nonzero entry in the ith column of Λ. Then if (A.11) holds,
0 = 2Λ`j = (ΛX)j` − (ΛX)`j =
∑
m
ΛjmXm` − Λ`iXij = −Λ`iXij ,
so Xij = 0, which confirms (A.12). As a consequence of (A.11) and (A.12), we have
2λ1 = 2Λ12 = (ΛA)21 − (ΛA)12 = −λ1A11 − λ1A22,
so A11 + A22 = −2. The same calculation applies for all λ2, . . . , λ(m−k)/2, so the trace of A is
negative (in fact, equal to −(m − k)), so A must have at least one negative eigenvalue. But from
(A.12) we see that every eigenvalue of A is an eigenvalue of X, and we know that X has only
positive eigenvalues. We conclude that the only solution to (A.11) is Λ = 0.
Sufficiency. Suppose the CCPs have common views on market impact G1 = G2 = G, and suppose
F1, F2 satisfy (2.8). Then (A.1) and (A.2) hold, and F1, F2 define an equilibrium. 




F1(t+ 1), F2(t+ 1)
)
defined in (2.10)–(2.11) are positive definite for all t ≥ 0,
(ii) if the spectral radius of G−11 G2 is strictly less than 1, as t→∞,
F2(t)F1(t)−1 → 0, x1(t)→ 0, x2(t)→ x.
Proof. In order to establish part (i), we will prove the following by induction: for all times t ≥ 0,








Clearly (A.13)–(A.14) hold when t = 0.
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Then, since G1, G2  0, clearly (A.13) holds at time t+ 1. Further,























establishing (A.14) at time t+ 1.





























t→∞x1(t) = limt→∞x− x2(t) = 0.

Theorem 2. A necessary and sufficient condition for a partitioned equilibrium with linear price
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 , i ∈ {1, 2}, (2.14)
with Gi(1, 1) ∈ Rm1×m1, Gi(2, 2) ∈ Rm2×m2 ,Gi(3, 3) ∈ Rm3×m3, where the submatrices satisfy
G1(2, 2) = G2(2, 2) , G(2, 2). (2.15)
In this case, CCP 1 clears the first m1 + m2 swap types, CCP 2 clears the last m2 + m3 swap








for any symmetric, positive definite matrices F1(2, 2), F2(2, 2) ∈ Rm2×m2 satisfying
F1(2, 2)−1 + F2(2, 2)−1 = G(2, 2)−1. (2.17)
Proof. Sufficiency. Let the number of rows (and columns) in the three blocks be m1, m2, and m3.
We claim that we get an equilibrium if CCP 1 clears the first m1 +m2 security types, CCP 2 clears








for some symmetric F1(2, 2), F2(2, 2) satisfying
F1(2, 2)−1 + F2(2, 2)−1 = G(2, 2)−1. (A.16)
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 , x1 =
 u
v1
 , x2 =
 v − v1
w
 ,
u ∈ Rm1 , v, v1 ∈ Rm2 , and w ∈ Rm3 . The minimization over (x1, x2) in (2.12) reduces to a
minimization over v1 with solution
v1 = (F1(2, 2) + F2(2, 2))−1F2(2, 2)v.
To verify the first condition in (2.13) observe that
x>1 F1x1 = u>G1(1, 1)u+ v>1 F1(2, 2)v1 (A.17)
and
x>1 P1G1x = u>G1(1, 1)u+ v>1 G(2, 2)v. (A.18)
But (A.16) implies that
G(2, 2) = (F−11 (2, 2) + F−12 (2, 2))−1 = F1(2, 2)(F1(2, 2) + F2(2, 2))−1F2(2, 2)
so (A.17) and (A.18) are equal. A similar argument verifies the second condition in (2.13).
Necessity. We now show that if (G1, G2) admit an equilibrium (F1, F2,m1,m2,m3), then (G1, G2)
have the block structure in (2.14)–(2.15).
First consider any securities i and j cleared only by CCPs 1 and 2, respectively. Write c1(i, j)
for the (i, j) entry of F1, and write c¯1(i, j), c¯1(i, i) for the corresponding entries of G1. Consider a
portfolio holding u units of i and w units of j. Condition (2.13) requires
u2c1(i, i) = u(c¯1(i, i)u+ c¯1(i, j)w)
121
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX
for all u and w. The case w = 0 implies that c1(i, i) = c¯1(i, i), and then any w 6= 0 implies
c¯1(i, j) = 0. Thus, the block G1(1, 3) = G1(3, 1) is identically zero. By the same argument,
G2(1, 3) = G2(3, 1) = 0.
Now suppose security j is cleared by both CCPs and consider a portfolio holding u units of i
and v 6= 0 units of j, with v1 units cleared through CCP 1 and v − v1 units cleared through CCP
2. To solve (2.12), the clearing member chooses v1 to minimize
u2c1(i, i) + 2uv1c1(i, j) + c1(j, j)v21 + c2(j, j)(v − v1)2,
which yields
v1 =
c2(j, j)v − c1(i, j)u
c1(j, j) + c2(j, j)
. (A.19)
To satisfy (2.13), we need to have
u2c1(i, i) + 2uv1c1(i, j) + c1(j, j)v21 = u2c¯1(i, i) + u(v1 + v)c¯1(i, j) + vv1c¯1(j, j).















If neither c1(i, j) nor c¯1(i, j) is zero, then v1 = 0 in (A.19) at some u 6= 0 but not in (A.20). So,
suppose c1(i, j) = 0. Then v1/v in (A.19) is a constant, independent of u. But for the same to hold
in (A.20) we must have c¯1(i, j) = 0. We conclude that G1(1, 2) = 0, and the same argument shows
G1(3, 2) = 0. 
Proposition 3 (Stable Partitioned Equilibrium). A partitioned equilibrium is stable if
G1(1, 1)  G2(1, 1), G1(3, 3)  G2(3, 3), (2.18)
in the positive definite order.
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where Gi(j, j) ∈ Rmj×mj , ∑kj=1mj = m, and for B ∪ F1 ∪ F2 = {1, 2, ..., k} the following hold:
1. for j ∈ B, G1(j, j) = G2(j, j)
2. for j ∈ F1, G2(j, j)  G1(j, j) and G1(j, j) 6= G2(j, j)
3. for j ∈ F2, G1(j, j)  G2(j, j) and G1(j, j) 6= G2(j, j)
This means that the two CCPs disagree for security classes in F = F2 ∪ F2 and agree on security
classes in B. There are no cross impacts between securities in different security classes.
Let E1 denote an equilibrium in Definition 3. From Theorem 2, we know that in any partitioned
equilibrium, CCPs can only jointly clear security classes for which they have the same market beliefs.
For equilibrium E1, we assume that CCP 1 clears security classes in S1, and CCP 2 clears security
classes in S2. Then we have F ∩ S1 = F1, F ∩ S2 = F2 and S1 ∩ S2 ⊆ B.
For a partitioned equilibrium E2 other than E1, we assume that CCP 1 clears security classes
in S˜1, and CCP 2 clears security classes in S˜2. We have:
S˜1 ∩ S˜2 ⊆ B, S˜1 ∪ S˜2 = {1, 2, ..., k}
For any position x> = (x>(1), .., x>(k)), with x(j) ∈ Rmj , by definition the total margin
collected in equilibrium E1 is













The total margin collected in equilibrium E2 (x˜1, x˜2, F˜1, F˜2) is











Taking the difference between (A.21) and (A.22), we get















Thus, equilibrium E1 is stable. 
A.2. Additional Proofs for Chapter 3
A.2.1. Proofs for Section 3.2
Theorem 4 (Existence and Convexity). The dynamic control problem defined in (3.8) is bounded and
an optimal solution u∗ always exists. In addition, the optimal value (the liquidity cost) is convex
in initial position.
Proof. Given q and u, x is then given by
x(t) = q −
∫ t
0
Y u(s) ds. (A.24)























Notice that J∗ is well defined since Jred(u) is lower bounded by 0. Then there exists a sequence
of feasible controls S = {u(i)|i = 1, 2, ...} such that
Jred(u(i))→ J∗. (A.26)
Without loss of generality, we assume that Jred(u(i)) < ∞. Combined with the fact that u(i) is
bounded, this suggests that x(i) must be bounded.
Next we will prove that S ⊂ L1([0,∞);Rm) is equi-integrable. Since uj(t) are bounded, ||u(t)||1
must be bounded, and we can simply take constant C such that
||u(t)||1 ≤ C, ∀u ∈ L1([0,∞);Rm), t ≥ 0.
Now consider any measurable set A ⊂ [0,∞) such that
∫
A
||u(s)||1 ds ≤ Cµ(A),∀ u ∈ S.
The equi-integrability then follows trivially. Next, by the Dunford–Pettis theorem (Chapter II,
Theorem T25 in Dellacherie and Meyer (2011)), S ⊂ L1([0,∞) is relatively compact for the weak
topology. Then there exists a weakly convergent subsequence {uˆ(i)} of {u(i)} that converges to
some u∗ ∈ S such that
uˆ(i)
w−→ u∗, uˆ(i) ∈ S. (A.27)
Due to its convexity, the reduced functional Jred is lower semicontinuous with respect to the






which allows us to conclude that u∗ is a minimizer.

Theorem 5 (Uniqueness). All optimal solutions for the the dynamic control problem in (3.8) have a
unique optimal position trajectory x∗ ∈ C([0,∞);Rn). Moreover, if the transaction cost functional
f()¸dot) is strictly convex, the optimal trading strategy u∗ ∈ L1([0,∞;Rm) must also be unique.
Proof. Denote J(u, x) to be the liquidity cost associated with feasible trading rate u and position
process x.
Suppose the optimal solution is not path-unique; then there exist (u1, x1), (u2, x2) that are both
optimal and such that




2 , x3 =
x1 + x2
2 .












f(u1(t) + u2(t)2 )dt+ µ
∫ ∞
0
(x1(t) + x2(t)2 )











= J(u1, x1)/2 + J(u2, x2)/2 = J∗.
(A.28)
The strict inequality is provided by the strict convexity of x>Σx. Notice that this contradicts the
optimality of (u1, x1), (u2, x2).
If f(·) is strictly convex, we will also require u1 = u2 such that
∫ ∞
0
f(u1(t) + u2(t)2 )dt =
∫ ∞
0
(f(u1(t)) + f(u2(t))) dt/2.




Theorem 6 (Sufficiency). The pair (x∗, u∗) ∈ C([0,∞);Rn)×L1([0,∞);Rm) form an optimal solu-
tion of (3.8) if, for all t ≥ 0,









x∗(s)>ΣY u ds. (3.9)
Proof. Define Jred(u) to be the optimal liquidity cost associated with trading strategy u. Now
suppose u∗ satisfies (3.9) but is not optimal. Then there must exist some feasible trading strategy
u˜ 6= u∗ such that
Jred(u˜) < Jred(u∗).
By algebra, we also have


























Since u∗ satisfies (3.9), it is easy to see that the second term is always positive. Hence we reach
a contradiction. 
A.2.2. Proofs for Section 3.3
Theorem 7 (Scaling). If u∗ is optimal for the problem starting from q, then u˜(t) = u∗(t/α) (∀t > 0)
is optimal for the problem starting with αq with ∀α ∈ R+, where
J∗(αq) = α3J∗(q).
Proof. Under trading strategy u˜,
x˜(t) = αq −
∫ t
0
Y u˜(s)ds = αq − α
∫ t/α
0
Y u(s)ds = αx(t/α).
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Suppose that x˜ is not the optimal path for the problem starting with αq; then there exists a better





















Theorem 8 (Finite Horizon). For any initial position q, the optimal position trajectory x(t) is guar-
anteed to reach zero in finite time.
Proof. First of all, define the norm || · ||Σ as
||q||Σ ,
√
q>Σq, ∀q ∈ Rn.
By Theorem 7, we know that it suffices to prove the theorem for ∀q ∈ Rn with
||q||Σ = 1.
Now, for any q, let x∗(t) be the position associated with its optimal execution strategy at time
t. Clearly, we have x∗(0) = q. Now define T (q) to be the first time that the norm of the position
is less than 1/2:
T (q) , inf{t : ||x∗(t)||Σ ≤ 12 ||q||Σ}.
Given that Y is full rank, we know that the set A = {Y u|u ∈ Rm, |ui| ≤ γi} is an n-dimensional




Now consider any q such that ||q||Σ = 1, and let x∗(t) be its position at time t in the optimal
execution strategy. Define
τi = inf{t ≥ 0 : ||x∗(t)||Σ ≤ 12i }.
Lemma 3 shows that τ1 − τ0 ≤ T ∗. By applying Theorem 7, we know that
T (q) ≤ T ∗/2, ∀||q|| ≤ 1/2.
It follows that




















Then, {τi} is increasing and bounded from above and so there exists a limit τ∗ such that
τ∗ = lim
i→∞
τi ≤ 2T ∗.
By continuity of x∗(t), we have x∗(τ∗) = 0. Then, it must be that
x∗(t) = 0, t ≥ τ∗.
otherwise the liquidity cost could be reduced. 
Lemma 3.
T ∗ , sup{T (q) : ||q||Σ = 1} <∞.
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Proof. ∀q such that ||q||Σ = 1, consider a trading strategy where we set
u(t) =

u∗, t ≤ 1
0, t > 1
,
where Y u∗ = q. Notice that this strategy is clearly feasible.





||q − tq||Σdt < 1

.












T (q) < 2

.






Lemma 1 (Optimality). A feasible control u∗ is optimal for (3.11) if and only if







where x∗ is uniquely determined by u∗ and q through the control function.
Proof. The sufficiency is given by Theorem 6. By Theorem 8, given the initial position q, there









subject to x˙(t) = −Y u(t), ∀ t ≥ 0,




We can obtain the necessity through Pontrjagin’s minimum principle. The convexity assump-
tion and regularity assumption are satisfied trivially in this case due to the linear control. The
Hamiltonian function of (A.30) can be written as
H(x, u, p) = x>Σx− p>Y u. (A.31)
Suppose that x∗(t), u∗(t) is optimal; then there must exist an optimal adjoint state p∗(t), t ∈ [0,∞)
that satisfies the following:
p˙∗(t) = −5x H(x∗(t), u∗(t), p∗(t)) = −2Σx∗(t),
p∗(T ) = 0.








H(x∗(t), u(t), p∗(t)), (A.33)









,∀t ∈ [0, T ].
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that ρ > 0. In order to simplify the notations and to
provide better intuitions, we define the following:
 a b
b c
 = Y >ΣY,
where a, b, c can be easily determined by the model parameters:
a = σ21, b = ρσ1σ2, c = σ22.
Now consider the following trading strategy:




≤ t ≤ qγ1 , trade at rate u∗(t) = (γ1, bcγ1)>.
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The assumption that γ2 ≥ |ρ|σ1γ1σ2 guarantees the feasibility of this strategy.
The liquidation path can now be calculated as
x∗(t) =

(q − γ1t, γ2t)> , 0 ≤ t ≤ bb+c qγ1(





≤ t ≤ qγ1
(0, 0)>, t > qγ1
. (A.34)
Then it’s easy to justify that (A.34) satisfies the optimality condition in Lemma 1.















Theorem 10 (One Asset). In the one-dimensional case, the cost of liquidating a position of q with
parameters (σ, γ, ν) is given by
J∗(q) = ν|q|+ µ |q|
3σ2
3γ .
Proof. In the one-dimensional case, it is easy to see that the transaction cost is only a function of
the total position traded and does not depend on the trading rate. As a result, the optimal trading
strategy is simply to unload the position as fast as possible.
With this in mind, the agent should trade the asset at a constant rate γ if q > 0 and −γ if
q ≤ 0. Then the liquidity cost is given by:










 , Y =
 1 0
0 1
 , q = (q, 0)>,




























3(1 + |ρ|σ1γ1σ2γ2 )
. (3.18)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that ρ > 0, q > 0, in which case the two assets are
positively correlated. Notice that Theorem 9 can be viewed as a special case where the transaction
cost parameters ν1, ν2 are zero. Accordingly, we first establish a short position in asset 2 in order
to hedge the market risk. Since there is no transaction cost, asset 2 is traded at full rate γ2 until
the ratio of position in the two assets reaches ρσ1σ2 , and this ratio is maintained till the end of the
liquidation process. Intuitively, by shorting asset 2 we are hedging the market risk but introducing
another source of idiosyncratic risk, and the ratio ρσ1σ2 is the balance point of such a trade-off. Now
we have transaction costs for trading asset 2, and it is expected that the agent will trade asset 2
less.
Now consider the following trading strategy:
• If q2 < 2γ1ν2µγ2ρσ1σ2 :
1. Sell asset 1 as fast as possible until the entire position is unloaded.
• If q2 ≥ 2γ1ν2µγ2ρσ1σ2 :
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1. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T1, trade at rate u∗(t) = (γ1,−γ2)>.
2. For T1 < t ≤ T2, trade at rate u∗(t) = (γ1, 0)>.


















The cost induced by this strategy is given by (3.18). This strategy can be shown to be optimal
by checking (3.9) in Theorem 6. We omit the details here as the algebra is cumbersome.

A.2.3. Proofs for Section 3.4
Proposition 5 (Factor Replicating Portfolio). If the large-universe conditions hold, then for each








1. The portfolio p(i,n)(t) has unit exposure on factor Fi(t):
p(i,n)(t)− Fi(t) = (i,n)(t),
where (i,n)(t) is zero mean and independent of all factor-price processes, and has variance
upper bounded by














(β(i,n)j )2 = 0.
Proof. For each factor i, we want to find the portfolio that has unit exposure on factor i and has






subject to (L(n))>w = ei,
w ∈ Rn.
(A.35)
where ei is the ith column of the K ×K identity matrix.
For simplicity, we will assume that the idiosyncratic risk for each individual asset is strictly
possitive (ς2j > 0), and will simply ignore the assets with ς2j = 0.
Now denote z = (Ξ(n))1/2w, and consider the singular value decomposition of L(n):
L(n) = (U (n))>Λ(n)V (n). (A.36)






s.t. (V (n))>Λ(n)U (n)(Ξ(n))−1/2z = ei,
z ∈ Rn.
(A.37)









The optimal solution z∗ is given by solving








































Lemma 4. Consider two liquidation problems that differ only in their covariance matrices (Σ1 and
Σ2, respectively). Suppose that their optimal liquidity costs are given by J∗1 (q) and J∗2 (q). If we
have
Σ1  Σ2,
where  is the positive definite ordering, then
J∗1 (q) ≤ J∗2 (q), ∀q ∈ Rn.
Proof. Suppose that u(2) ∈ L1([0,∞);Rm) is the optimal solution to problem 2, and x(2) ∈
C([0,∞);Rn) is the corresponding position process. Since problems 1 and 2 differ only in their
covariance matrices, (u(2), x(2)) is also feasible for problem 1. If we denote J∗q (q) as the optimal
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where the first inequality comes from the fact that Σ1  Σ2. 
Theorem 12 (Lower Bound of Hedging Benefits). If we are allowed to trade other assets during the



















subject to x˙(t) = −Y u(t), ∀ t ≥ 0,




Since there are no correlations, it is easy to see that the optimal execution strategy in this case








Notice that Ξ(n)  Σ(n); then, by applying Lemma 4 stated above, we always have









Theorem 13 (Large Universe). If the large-universe property is satisfied, then, asymptotically, the
liquidity cost of any portfolio consisting of finitely many assets will be driven purely by idiosyncratic
risks. More specifically, we have








where q is defined in (3.21), and J∗n(q) represents the optimal costs of liquidating q ∈ RA in An.
Proof. The key to the proof is finding a trading strategy that converges to the lower bound asymp-
totically. We assume that the chosen factor portfolios don’t contain assets in the liquidation port-
folio. By Proposition 5, for each factor Fi(t) there exists a sequence of portfolios {p(i,n)(t)} char-
acterized by {β(i,n)} such that p(i,n)(t)→ Fi(t). More specifically, we have ∑nj=1(β(i,n)j )2 → 0.
Now, for each asset j in the portfolio to be liquidated, we construct a sequence of portfolios
































where l¯ = maxi≤m,j≤K lij .
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k lki = lji.
Essentially, we have created a sequence of portfolios that has the same factor exposure as that of















N(n) , ∀k ≤ n.
Intuitively 1N(n) can be viewed as the upper bound of the weight of each asset in every portfolio
we constructed. Given that ∑nk=1(βˆ(j,n)k )2 → 0, we have N(n)→∞.
We consider the following “dumb” strategy for the problem indexed by n:
1. For 0 ≤ t ≤ |qj |γj , buy asset j at a rate of −
qj
|qj |γj .
2. For 0 ≤ t ≤
∑m
j=1 |qj |
N(n)γ , buy portfolio z
(j,n) at a rate of −qj∑m
i=1 |qi|




N(n)γ ≤ t ≤
|qj |
γj
, buy z(j,n) at a rate of qj|qj |γj . Do it for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Let’s first try to understand this “dumb” strategy. First of all, we notice that z(j,n) approximates
the factor risk exposure of asset j, and so step 2 is the hedging process. Basically, we acquire a
certain amount of portfolio z(j,n) in order to hedge the factor risks contributed by asset j. Step 3
is the liquidation process: we sell each asset together with its hedging portfolio as soon as possible.
We still need to check whether this strategy violates the liquidity constraints. Consider a











Hence the liquidity constraint is satisfied in step 1.




given n is large enough. As a result, given n is large enough, all the liquidity constraints are
satisfied.

















(qj − γjt)2ς2j +
m∑
j=1
(qj − γjtn)2 t
2
t2n






























and lz(j,n) ∈ RK is the factor exposure of portfolio z(j,n), and ς2z(j,n) is its idiosyncratic risk exposure.








Notice that by construction, we have the following:














2 = 0. (A.46)
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(qj − γjt)2ς2j +
m∑
j=1













(qj − γjt)2ς2j +
m∑
j=1




































































By using (A.46) and the fact that limn→∞ tn = 0, we have
lim
n→∞ Jn(q) ≤ J˜
∗(q).








n(q) ≤ limn→∞ Jn(q) ≤ J˜
∗(q).





and the proof of the theorem is complete. 
Theorem 14 (Convergence Speed). Asymptotically, the difference between the liquidity cost and the










min|J∗n(q)− J∗∞(q)| <∞. (3.24)
Proof. According to (A.39), (A.43), (A.46), and (A.49), we have

































where A,B are constants that are not related to n:





























Theorem 15 (Random factor loading). If the asset factor loadings are drawn independently from a










n|J∗n(q)− J∗∞(q)| <∞, a.s. (3.26)
Proof. Now suppose that the factor loadings are i.i.d., and define Gˆ ∈ RK×K as
Gˆij =

E[lkilkj ], i 6= j,
E[l2ki], i = j.














Suppose that λˆmin is the smallest eigenvalue of Gˆ. It is easy to see that det(Gˆ) > 0 if there is










Theorem 16 (Generalization). For any liquidation model specified in 3.27, if the transaction cost
functional is twice differentiable with
fˆ ′(0) = 0, fˆ(0) = 0,







J˜∗(qj , ςj , νj , γj), (3.29)
where J∗n(q) represents the optimal liquidity costs for a portfolio q with assets in An.
Proof. We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose that f is a convex function:
f : [−1, 1]→ R+ ∪ {+∞}.
If f(·) is twice differentiable and
f(0) = 0, f ′(0) = 0, f ′′(0) > 0, (A.52)
then there exists δ > 0 such that for any |β| < δ,
f(βx) ≤ Cβ2f(x), ∀|x| ≤ 1, (A.53)
where C is some constant.









Hence there exists δ such that for ∀β < δ we have
1
2f




















This proves the lemma. 
Following the proof in Theorem 13, we construct a series of portfolios {z(j,n)} for each asset
j ≤ m. Moreover, we denote u˜∗j (t) to be the optimal trading strategy of liquidating asset j alone
without hedging with other assets and only considering its idiosyncratic risk.







k , where βˆ
(j,n)
k is defined in








hence we have N(n)→∞.
Now consider the following trading strategy:
1. For 0 ≤ t ≤ tn, buy portfolio z(j,n) at a rate of −qj∑m
j=1 |qj |
√






2. For t > tn, trade asset j at a rate of u˜∗j (t− tn) and trade z(j,n) at a rate of −u˜∗j (t− tn). Do
it for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
In this case, the total cost is made up of two parts, namely, transaction costs and market risks.
Let us look at them separately.
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First, following this trading strategy (Vn(t)), the market risk contribution of the position at

















(qj − γjt)2ς2j +
m∑
j=1
(qj − γjtn)2 t
2
t2n

































, lz(j,n) are defined in the same way. Further, we have
lz(j,n) = lj , limn→∞ ς
2
z(j,n) = 0, limn→∞ tn = 0. (A.55)


































































N(n)→ 0. Then we can






































































































































νj fˆ(u˜∗j (t)/γj)dt. (A.58)






















































The first inequality is a direct application of 5, and the last equality is due to the fact that∑n
k=1(βˆ
(j)
nk )2 → 0.








Given that this cost should never be smaller than the optimal cost, together with (A.56), (A.57),


























J˜∗(qj , ςj , νj , γj).














Proof. From Theorem 12, we know that the term in the denominator is the lower bound of the
liquidity cost of the portfolio when we neglect the transaction costs. Thus, it also has to be the








Now consider the trading strategy given in the proof of Theorem 13; the only difference here
is that we also have to calculate the transaction cost from this strategy. The transaction cost
comes from two sources: the transaction cost of selling the position in the portfolio that is given
by ∑mj=1 νj |qj | and the transaction cost of establishing and liquidating the hedging positions. More
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|βˆ(j,n)k |2 → 0, n→∞, (A.63)


















































Combining (A.61) and (A.65), we complete the proof of the theorem.

Theorem 18 (ETF). If the large-universe property is satisfied, then, asymptotically, the cost for
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3 (|α1|γETF + γj)q
3
j , (3.32)
where qi = 0, ∀i 6= j.
Proof. We start with the following observations:
1. For asset j, the fastest trading rate attainable is |αj |γETF + γj . It is obtained by selling asset
j and the ETF at full rate, but at the same time buying back other assets in the ETF, so
that the net liquidity contribution from trading the ETF is just |αj |γETF. The feasibility of
this strategy is guaranteed by the assumption that |αiγETF| < γi.
2. At any time point during the liquidation process, the total risk is made up of three com-
ponents: the idiosyncratic risk of asset j, which is given by ς2j x2j (t); idiosyncratic risks of
the hedging positions; and the entire portfolio’s market risk. Since the latter two terms are
nonnegative, the total risk term is always greater than or equal to ς2j x2j (t).








3 (|αj |γETF + γj)q
3
j .
As a result, the right-hand side of (3.32) is actually the lower bound of the liquidity cost.
As discussed above, it is possible to trade asset j at rate |αj |γETF + γj by essentially trading
a portfolio p containing the ETF and all the assets in it (this portfolio has only a net position in








where γp = |α1|γETF + γj , and this completes the proof of the theorem. 
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A.3. Additional Proofs for Chapter 4
Theorem 19 (Value Function for Market Maker). The value function V (q, δ) is linear in δ; that is,
it takes the form
V (q, δ) = α(q)δ − β(q), (4.5)
where the functions α : R+ → R and β : R+ → R are uniquely determined by the integral equations
α(q) = µ






α(q − x)− 1)f(x) dx}+ γp+J
µp+u + γ + η+
+ η
+






µp+u + γ + η+
{∫ q
0




α(q − x)− 1)xf(x) dx
− λu¯+(α(q)− 1)}+ γJ¯+
µp+u + γ + η+
+ η
+

















Proof. First of all, we solve for the solution to equation (4.4). The boundary condition can be
verified by setting q = 0 in (4.4), which gives
















Notice that it’s an integral equation with a linear drift on δ. Hence the solution of V (0, δ)
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should also be linear on δ. The equation above thus boils down to
µ+ γ
µ
(α(0)δ − β(0)) = E
[




I{u≤0} (α(0)(δ − λu)− β(0))
]
+ γ(δ − J¯+)/µ







α(0)(δ − λu)− β(0))f(u)du+ γ(δ − J¯+)/µ.












For q > 0, the integral equation still has a linear drift, which provides the linearity of the
solution:
µ+ γ + η+
µ
(





α(q − u)(δ − λu)− β(q − u))]













α(q)(δ − λu)− β(q))f(u)du







Solving the equation for α(q) and β(q), we obtain the solution:
V (q, δ) = α(q)δ − β(q).
Now we would like to prove the uniqueness and existence of the solution to equations (4.6) and
(4.7). Notice that α(·) is defined on R+. Then the expression of α(q) is a Volterra integral equation
of the second kind. We can rewrite the expression as follows:
α(q) = k1(q) +
∫ q
0













µp+u + γ + η+
, ∀q ∈ R+,
k2(x, q, z) = { µf(q − x)
µp+u + γ + η+
+ η
+g(x/q)/q
µp+u + γ + η+
}z, ∀q ∈ R+, x ∈ R+, z ∈ R.
Given the continuity of f(·), g(·), we have k1 ∈ C(R+), k2 ∈ C(R+ × R+ × R). Also, it is trivial
that k2 satisfies the following Lipschitz condition:
|k2(x, q, z)− k2(x, q, z′)| ≤ L(x, q)|z − z′|, for some L ∈ C(R+ × R+).
Hence by Theorem 2.1.1 of Hackbusch (1995), there is exactly one solution of the integral
equation (A.66). Additionally, the solution α(·) is continuous on R+.
The existence and uniqueness of β(·) can be established in a similar way. Specifically, we can
write equation (4.7) in the following form:
β(q) = k3(q) +
∫ q
0










α(q−x)− 1)xf(x)dx−λu¯+(α(q)− 1)}+ γJ¯+
µp+u + γ + η+
, ∀q ∈ R+,
k4(x, q, z) = k2(x, q, z), ∀q ∈ R+, x ∈ R+, z ∈ R.
Hence, by a similar analysis, there is exactly one solution to integral equation (4.7), and that
solution is continuous.

Theorem 20. 1. Compared with equation (4.1), we have





2. The probability of execution α(q) is non-increasing in queue position.
3. The adverse selection is positive
β(q)/α(q) > 0.




J , limq→∞β(q) = J¯
+.
Proof. 1. Consider an order placed on the ask side at position q at time 0; denote τ∗ to be the
time that it is filled or canceled.
V (q, δ) = E
[










(δ − (P − P0)) I{FILL}
]
= P(FILL)δ − P(FILL)E [Pτ∗ − P0|FILL] .
(A.68)
Notice that E [Pτ∗ − P0|FILL] represents the opportunity cost conditional on executing the
order, which coincides with the definition of adverse selection.
Compared to the notations in equation (4.5), it is easy to see that
α(q) = P(FILL) β(q)/α(q) = E [Pτ∗ − P0|FILL] .
Hence α(q) is exactly the probability of the order being executed, and β(q)/α(q) represents
the adverse selection cost.
2. It suffices to show that ∀0 ≤ q0 < q1, we have α(q0) ≥ α(q1).
Consider an infinitesimal order A0 with a queue position q0, and let E0 be the set of events
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that the order is eventually filled. Then we have
α(q0) = P(E0).
Notice that in our model, the value of an order does not depend on the orders that follows
it in the queue. Hence it is possible to couple the order A0 with an infinitesimal order A1 in
the exact same queue but with a position q1. Similarly, we define E1 to be the set of events
that A1 is eventually executed.
Notice that since the size of the orders is infinitesimal, the marginal probabilities P(E0),P(E1)
should be intact with coupling. There are two scenarios where E1 can happen:
• A1 is executed by a trade. Then, in our setup, there can be no price jump before this
event. As A0 is placed in front of A1, it should be executed already.
• A1 is executed by a positive price jump. In our setup, there can be no negative price
jump before this event. Hence A0 can be executed either by this positive price jump or
by an earlier trade.
The above analysis shows that {E1} ⊆ {E0}; hence
α(q1) = P(E1) ≤ P(E0) = α(q0).
3. Since ∀q > 0, 0 < α(q) < 1, it suffices to show that ∀q > 0, β(q) > 0.
We have already proved that α(q) is increasing in q; hence ∀0 ≤ x < q , α(q − x) ≥ α(q).
According to equation (4.6), we have
β(q) ≥ µ
µp+u + γ + η+
{∫ q
0







µp+u + γ + η+
+ η
+





Notice that we have β(0) > 0 and that β(·) is continuous. Now suppose that β(q) is not
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always positive for q ≥ 0; then there must exist q0 such that β(·) attains a value of zero
for the first time. By continuity, we have β(q) > 0 for q ∈ [0, q0). Notice that at q0, the
right-hand side of equation (A.69), is strictly positive; hence it is impossible that β(q0) = 0.
As a result, it must be that β(·) is positive for all q ≥ 0.






f(t)dt = p+u , ∀s ≥ 0.
Hence the Laplace transform of f(·) exists on [0,+∞). Let P (s) denote the Laplace transform










Now take the Laplace transform on both sides of equation (A.70); we have
L{C}(s) = µ
µp+u + γ














Given the fact that ∀s ≥ 0, P (s) ≤ p+u , we have µp+u +γ−µP (s) > 0. As a result, the Laplace




s(µp+u + γ − µP (s)) . (A.71)
Hence, the Laplace transform for α(q) is
L{α}(s) = L{C}(s) + 1/s = γ(p
+
J − 1)
s(µp+u + γ − µP (s)) + 1/s. (A.72)
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By the final value theorem of Laplace transform, we have
lim
q→∞α(q) = lims→0 sL{α}(s) =
−γ(p+J − 1)
µp+ γ − µP (0) + 1 = p
+
J .
Similarly, it is easy to see that the Laplace transform of β(q) is also well defined on [0,+∞);
hence we have
L{β}(s) = − µ
µp+u + γ − µP (s) [λL{C}(s)P
′(s) + λu¯+L{C}(s)− γJ¯+/(sµ)]. (A.73)
Then by the finite value theorem of Laplace transform:
lim




µp+u + γ − µP (s) [λsL{C}(s)P




Theorem 21 (Exponential Trade Sizes). Suppose there are no cancellations and that the trades sizes
follow the exponential distribution with parameter θ > 0, i.e.,
f(u) , θ2e
−θ|u|,
for u ∈ R. Then, the value function is given by V (δ, q) = α(q)δ − β(q), where




β(q) = J¯+(1− µ





−bq + λ(γ − µ)γ(p
+
J − 1)
2(γ + µ/2)3 qe
−bq, (4.10)
for all q ≥ 0, where b , (γ+ζ)θµ/2+γ .
Proof. First denote P (s) as the Laplace transform of the truncated p.d.f. of trade size on the
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positive domain (f(u) = θ2e−θu). We have
P (s) = θ2(s+ θ) u¯
+ = 12θ . (A.75)




s(µp+u + γ − µP (s)) + 1/s. (A.76)
Then, by taking the inverse Laplace transform, we get














2(γ + µ/2)2θ(s+ b) +
λ(γ − µ)γ(p+J − 1)
2(γ + µ/2)3(s+ b)2 . (A.78)
where b = γθγ+µ/2 . Taking the inverse Laplace Transform, we get






−bq + λ(γ − µ)γ(p
+
J − 1)
2(γ + µ/2)3 qe
−bq. (A.79)

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